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INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 1991, national attention focused on the con-
gressional testimony of Kimberly Bergalis, a young woman dying of
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).' Bergalis had con-
1. See PhilipJ. Hilts, AIDS Patient Urges Congress to Pass Testing Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27,
1991, at A12 (describing circumstances surrounding testimony of 23-year-old AIDS victim
Kimberly Bergalis). AIDS occurs from weakened cell-mediated (T-cell) immunity, which
causes the patient to become increasingly prone to opportunistic infections and unusual can-
cers. See generally JAMES DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 978 (2d ed. 1990) (ex-
plaining genetic makeup and functioning of AIDS virus); PROFESSIONAL GUIDE TO DISEASES
366 (Springhouse 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter GUIDE TO DISEASES] (describing, in general terms,
characteristics of AIDS). The cause of AIDS is the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), of
which there are two strains: HIV-1 and HIV-2. DARNELL, supra, at 979 (describing schematic
structure of both strains). Researchers believe the virus is transmitted by direct inoculation
through intimate sexual contact, especially associated with rectal muscosal trauma, and also
through blood transfusions, contaminated needles, and transplacental contact between a
mother and her fetus. GUIDE TO DISEASES, supra, at 366. Symptoms manifest themselves, on
average, within one to three years after exposure to HIV. Id.
AIDS gets its name from the fact that the virus, once in the body, kills cells involved in the
body's immune system. DARNELL, supra, at 980. Other viruses, conversely, transform rather
than kill their host cells. Id. As a result, the AIDS victim becomes increasingly susceptible to
"opportunistic infections." Id. The first sign of the virus is typically the development of
Kaposi's sarcoma, a vascular tumor that produces purple and brown "plaques" or "nodules"
on the lower legs and often on other parts of the body when associated with AIDS. GUIDE TO
DISEASES, supra, at 367. Other symptoms of the disease include fatigue, afternoon fevers,
night sweats, weight loss, diarrhea, and coughing. Typically, two or more of the symptoms
will occur concurrently. Id. The virus can also attack the brain and cause severe mental dete-
rioration. DARNELL, supra, at 980. The most common cause of death results from a pneu-
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tracted AIDS from her dentist, Dr. David Acer, during oral surgery.2
She appeared before the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce in sup-
port of a bill that would require doctors and other health care work-
ers (HCWs) to be tested for the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV).3 Since Bergalis' testimony, Congress has yet to enact any law
mandating HIV testing of HCWs. 4 Congress has passed, however, a
law requiring state legislatures to enact practice guidelines for HIV-
positive HCWs based on the guidelines promulgated by the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC).5 The states may adopt either the CDC
monic infection against which the body cannot defend itself. GuIDrE TO DISEASES, supra, at
367.
Homosexual and bisexual men who are sexually active with multiple partners comprise the
group most at risk for HIV infection. Id. at 366. Other at-risk groups include intravenous
drug users (from contaminated needles), hemophiliacs, and children born to persons with the
disease. Id. There is currently no cure for AIDS. Id. at 367. Drug research has centered
around attempting to stop the growth of the virus and to restore the body's immune system.
Id. Once the disease manifests itself as AIDS, more than 757o of the disease's victims die
within two years. Id at 366.
2. Hilts, supra note 1, at A12. It remains unclear how the virus was transmitted from the
doctor to Bergalis. Id. Bergalis died from AIDS on December 8, 1991. Don Aucoin, Testing
Debate Is Still Raging, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1991, at I (discussing debate over mandatory
HIV testing of medical personnel in context of Bergalis' death). "
3. See H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing establishment of protections
against transmission of certain communicable diseases for both health care workers and pa-
tients); see also Prevention of HIV Transmission: Hearings on H.R. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1991) [here-
inafter Hearings on H.R. 2788] (statement of Kimberly Bergalis, AIDS victim). The brief state-
ment of Ms. Bergalis reads:
I would like to say that AIDS is a terrible disease which we must take seriously. I
did nothing wrong, yet I am being made to suffer like this. My life has been taken
away. Please enact legislation so that no other patient or health care provider will
have to go through the hell that I have.
Hearings on H.R. 2788, supra, at 128.
4. A bill sponsored by Representative William E. Dannemeyer (R-Cal.) and introduced
in the House onJune 26, 1991 is still pending. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see
infra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing Representative Dannemeyer's bill).
5. See Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (to be codified at42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2) (detail-
ing steps states must take regarding prevention of HIV and hepatitis-B virus (HBV) transmis-
sion in order to avoid becoming ineligible for assistance under Public Health Service Act).
Senator Jesse Helms, a North Carolina Republican, originally succeeded in persuading the
Senate to pass an amendment to this Appropriations Act that would have subjected HCWs to
fines and prison terms in situations where an HCW knows that he or she is HIV positive and
intentionally performs invasive medical procedures without giving the patient prior notifica-
tion of his or her condition. See 137 CONG. REC. S 10,363 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (listing
results of vote on Helms amendment); infra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing and
quoting Helms amendment); see also 137 CONG. REC. 59778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (provid-
ing language of Helms amendment). Although Helms' initiative passed in the Senate, a con-
ference committee subsequently rejected the amendment. 137 CONG. REC. H7385 (daily ed.
October 3, 1991). According to one source, the Helms amendment was killed "because it was
recognized up front that the House would never accept it with that language in it." SeeJoyce
Price, AIDS Testing Likely To Pass, WASH. TiMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at A3 (quoting Bob Maynes,
spokesperson for Sen. Dennis DeConcini, ranking Democrat on conference committee). In-
stead, the conference committee adopted an amendment introduced by Senator Robert Dole
(R-Kan.) that had previously passed by unanimous consent in the Senate. 137 CONG. REC.
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guidelines as promulgated or ones "equivalent" to those of the
CDC.6 Additionally, the federal law requires a state's public health
official to certify to the director of the CDC within a year of the bill's
signing that guidelines have been instituted in the state.7 Failure to
issue such guidelines will render the state ineligible for federal mon-
ies under the Public Health Service Act.8
Specifically, the CDC guidelines do not require mandatory testing
of HCWs, but rather urge HCWs to undergo voluntary testing for
HIV infection. 9 According to the guidelines, those HCWs who test
positive for the virus should generally refrain from practicing "ex-
posure-prone" procedures.' 0 Interestingly, the CDC leaves to each
hospital and institution the responsibility of defining for itself what
procedures should be classified as "exposure-prone." 11 Further-
S10,348-50, 10,363 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (providing language of Sen. Dole's amendment
and listing results of vote on amendment); infra note 6 (printing portion of Dole's amend-
ment). Section 633 of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1992 subsequently incorporated the substance of Senator Dole's amendment and was
enacted into law. Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. at 876 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300ee-2).
6. Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. at 876 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2).
The statute reads, in pertinent part:
[E]ach State Public Health Official shall, not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, certify to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that
guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or guidelines which are
equivalent to those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control concerning rec-
ommendations for preventing the transmission of the human immunodeficiency vi-
rus and the hepatitis B virus during exposure prone invasive procedures ... have
been instituted in the State.
Id. The legislative history of the statute reveals that Congress intended for the CDC to deter-
mine whether guidelines other than those issued by the CDC are "equivalent" to the CDC
guidelines. H.R. REP. No. 234, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 48-49 (1991) (discussing process by
which states will be reviewed regarding compliance with equivalency requirement of statute).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. at 876 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2)
(stipulating that guidelines apply to all health officials practicing within states and that compli-
ance with guidelines is responsibility of state public health officials).
8. Id. (providing ineligibility requirement that allows for extension of time period
where state shows that additional time is required to institute guidelines); see also Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300aaa-13 (1988) (detailing organization, function,
and powers of Public Health Service).
9. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis
B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1, 5 (1991) [hereinafter Recommendations for Preventing Transmission) (reprinting CDC
guidelines, which state that HCWs performing exposure-prone procedures should know their
HIV status but that available data on risk of transmission of HIV virus from HCW to patient
"does not support the diversion of resources that would be required to implement mandatory
testing programs"); see also 137 CONG. REC. S9978-79 (daily ed. July 15, 1991) (reprinting
CDC guidelines as published onJuly 12, 1991).
10. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5.
11. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5. The CDC report does,
however, briefly characterize which procedures are likely to be exposure prone. The report
states that the "characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital palpitation of a
needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the HCW's fingers and a needle or
other sharp object in a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic site." Id, at 4. Such a
description could only have been intended to serve as a guide to hospitals and institutions
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more, an infected HCW may perform exposure-prone procedures
only if he or she first seeks the counsel of an "expert review panel,"
which will advise the HCW as to the circumstances, if any, under
which he or she may continue to perform these procedures. 12
Lastly, the CDC guidelines suggest that doctors seek consent from
patients if the treating HCW is HIV-positive, but, in instances where
an HIV-positive HCW performs an exposure-prone procedure with-
out the patient's consent, postoperative notification of the patient
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.13
This Comment addresses two issues arising from the CDC guide-
lines: first, the distinction between voluntary and mandatory test-
ing, and second, whether HCWs who are HIV positive should be
required to obtain informed consent from patients. Part I analyzes
the state of the law regarding principles of risk determination and
mandatory testing. Part II discusses ways that the application of
theories of informed consent and duty to warn third parties compel
an HCW, under certain conditions, to reveal that he or she is HIV
positive. Part III examines the CDC guidelines in detail and in rela-
tion to the legal principles discussed in Parts I and II. Questions
discussed here include whether the CDC guidelines are consistent
with or contradict the current state of the common law, and whether
the CDC has provided effective guidance for the medical commu-
nity. Part IV predicts future liabilities and litigation arising from
current CDC guidelines and concludes with specific recommenda-
tions for future governmental and medical action.
I. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND, PRE-CDC GUIDELINES
The purpose of the CDC guidelines is to lessen the risk of trans-
mission from HCWs to patients during invasive procedures.' 4 The
guidelines define invasive procedures as those involving "surgical
entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic
injuries."'15 The guidelines offer recommendations to the medical
given the fact that the guidelines expressly decline to set forth a blanket definition of what
constitutes an "exposure-prone procedure." Id. at 5.
12. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 ("Such circumstances
would include notifying prospective patients of the HCW's seropositivity before they undergo
exposure-prone procedures.").
13. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that case-by-case
analysis should take into consideration "an assessment of specific risks, confidentiality issues,
and available resources").
14. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 1 (suggesting that risk
of HIV transmission from HCW to patient is not yet quantifiable, but that guidelines provide
effective recommendations to prevent transmission in medical settings).
15. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 9. The CDC considers
these types of procedures invasive when they are associated with:
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community to reduce the risk of transmission during these
procedures. 16
Legal efficacy of the CDC guidelines may be analyzed using a
framework that courts have developed covering tort principles.'
7
Principles of tort law address risk of harm and its prevention. These
principles give rise to duties of care' 8 that define the actions and
precautions parties must take with respect to a particular risk so as
to minimize the harm's chance of occurrence or lessen its effect,
thereby protecting the safety of others.' 9
A. Risk Analysis in Tort for Determining Duties of Care
One commentator suggests that in the health care context, an
analysis of the magnitude of harm and the probability of its occur-
rence determines whether a risk is unacceptable. 20 Specifically, sec-
tion 293 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides an analytical
framework to use in making this risk assessment. The Restatement's
framework includes an examination of (1) the social value the law
attaches to the threatened interests; (2) the probability that the ac-
tor's conduct will invade the interests of another; (3) the possible
extent of harm to the threatened interest; and (4) the number of
persons potentially hurt if the harm were to occur.2' This commen-
I) an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient setting,
including both physician's and dentist's offices; 2) cardiac catherization and angi-
ographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or caesarean delivery or other invasive or obstetric
procedure during which bleeding may occur; or 4) the manipulation, cutting or re-
moval of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleed-
ing occurs or the potential for bleeding exists.
Id.
16. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 1.
17. See infra notes 20-63 and accompanying text (setting forth framework courts have
developed).
18. See W. PAGE KEETON ST AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 356-
59 (5th ed. 1984) (defining tort concept of duty). Specifically, a legal duty is "only an expres-
sion of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id.
19. See id § 56, at 383-85 (listing custodial relationships that require parties to guard
against foreseeable harm arising from protective element of relationships).
20. See Gordon G. Keyes, Health-Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk of Transmission Bal-
anced Against the Interests of Professionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589, 603, 604 (1990)
(referring to § 293 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). In his article, Keyes discusses the risk
assessment analysis in the context of a Fifth Circuit case. Id.; see Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding tour-bus company's policy requir-
ing its drivers to be less than 40 years old for safety reasons). Keyes writes that "[in uphold-
ing the bus company's rule, the court recognized that in assessing safety requirements it must
consider both the likelihood and severity of the threatened harm. The greater the likelihood
and severity of harm, the more stringent the job qualifications to promote safety may be."
Keyes, supra, at 604.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (1981). Additionally, the American Medical
Association (AMA) articulated its risk framework for HIV-positive HCWs in its amicus curiae
brief in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). The AMA framework examines:
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tator contends that this analysis should not attempt to determine the
precise risk of an HIV-infected HCW transmitting the disease to a
patient,22 but rather, the analysis should balance the value of having
the HCW perform the invasive procedure against the degree of risk
of disease transmission.23 This approach seems to imply that when-
ever practical, a non-HIV-positive HCW should perform the inva-
sive procedure. Several issues remain unanswered by this analysis,
however, such as how great the risk of transmission must be to com-
pel an HCW to stop performing invasive procedures.2 4 And once
an HCW is infected, the question becomes whether hospitals should
restrict all or only some procedures that the HCW may perform.
Courts use the above tort theories to address issues raised by HIV-
positive HCWs.
1. Tort analysis of transmission risk in case law
Recent cases have adopted the framework of section 293 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, but have introduced additional and ar-
guably more dispositive elements into the analysis.2 5 In Estate of
Behringer v. Medical Center,26 a New Jersey appellate court considered
the proposition that courts should balance the risk of transmission
against the utility of having infected HCWs perform invasive proce-
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk
(how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and
will cause varying degrees of harm.
Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners' at 19,
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
22. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04 (stating that analytical structure and language of
classic tort law offer sound framework for analyzing risk).
23. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04 (basing supposition on probable availability of
other qualified HCWs).
24. Cf. Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04 (suggesting that attempting to determine actual
rate of transmission is futile and counterproductive).
25. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1392 (E.D. La. 1989) (con-
cluding that social value attached to plaintiff's not revealing HIV status to defendant hospital
is necessarily subordinated to hospital's need to know plaintiff's HIV status in order to pro-
tect not only patients and co-workers, but plaintiff himself), aft'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.
1990); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 249-50 (D.
Neb. 1988) (concluding that as actor's conduct involved only casual contact between staff and
clients, probability of transmission was zero, and therefore Fourth Amendment concerns pre-
vailed over requirement of mandatory HIV testing of staff), aft'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1295, 1300
& n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (discussing state statute prohibiting disclosure of confidential HIV
information absent compelling public need to prevent spread of AIDS), appeal docketed, No.
196 (Pa. Aug. 7, 1992). In addition, in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), the
Supreme Court adopted the AMA's criteria for determining the medical risks of employing
someone with a contagious disease. These factors included the duration and severity of the
condition, as well as the probability of transmission to others. Id. at 288.
26. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
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dures, 27 particularly in instances in which other non-HIV-positive
HCWs qualified to perform the procedures are available. 28 More
importantly, this court looked beyond tort theory by employing a
patient-centered approach to health care risk analysis. 29 Fundamen-
tally, the court found that where there is any risk of transmission to
a patient of any disease, the HCW must refrain from performing
invasive procedures.3 0 The court's rationale for this rule rested on
the fact that transmission of HIV means certain death for the in-
fected patient.3' The court found that hospitals have a duty to re-
strict HCWs from performing invasive procedures where the
procedures pose "any risk" of harm to the patient.32 In this case,
the court determined that such a risk was present.33 Thus, the court
held that the medical center acted properly by prohibiting the plain-
tiff, Dr. Behringer, from performing further surgery. 4 The court
27. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1282 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991) (quoting Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04 n.114) (discussing framework for assessing
risk).
28. See id. at 1283 (adopting view that availability of another equally competent physician
is factor that patient must have opportunity to consider when practicing HCW is seropositive
for AIDS); see also Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to
Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12, 23 (1989) (stressing that
patients, if given choice, would generally not choose HCWs infected with HIV). In his article,
Keyes also concluded that HCW substitution is a viable policy option because, in his view,
only a small percentage of all providers will be excluded from performing only one
aspect of health care, [so] restrictions due to HIV infection will only interfere with
the provision of a very small fraction of the total health care services. All of these
services can be adequately provided by non-infected practitioners.
Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04 n. 114.
29. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (rationalizing adoption of patient-centered approach
on New Jersey's strong policy of supporting patient rights); see also Piller v. Kovarsky, 476
A.2d 1279, 1281 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (stating that New Jersey public policy sup-
ports patient-physician privilege because it enables "patient to secure medical services with-
out fear of betrayal and unwarranted embarrassing and detrimental disclosure").
30. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (discussing obligations of HIV-infected HCW to
patient).
31. See id at 1281-82 (contending that possibility that transmission to patient will result
in death must be considered relevant factor in determining acceptable level of risk); see also
David Orentlicher, HIV-Infected Surgeons: Behringer v. Medical Center, 266JAMA 1134, 1135
(1991) (contending that court in Behringer adopted analysis that attempts to eliminate all risks
of transmission). Orentlicher further argues that this "zero-tolerance" limit goes too far be-
cause it would permit discrimination against HCWs in violation of the federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws. Orentlicher, supra, at 1135. Instead, he suggests that hospitals, and thus courts,
should adopt the "significant risk" standard when imposing practice restrictions, which can be
found in antidiscrimination laws, as opposed to an "appreciable," "potential," or "theoreti-
cal" standard. Id. at 1136; see also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing "signif-
icant risk" standard).
32. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (NJ. Super. Ct. Laws
Div. 199 1) ("Where the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of a low risk of transmission
justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive procedures when there is 'any' risk
of transmission.").
33. Id (finding there was " 'reasonable probability of substantial harm' if plaintiff contin-
ued to perform invasive procedures").
34. Id. The court was also persuaded by the fact that the Medical Center acted without
"any suggestion of prejudgment or arbitrariness." lit Further, the court was convinced that
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rejected any attempt to quantify the magnitude of the risk of trans-
mission and instead concluded that hospitals must prohibit infected
HCWs from performing invasive procedures so as to eliminate all
chances of transmission.35
According to the court in Behringer, an HIV-positive HCW who
continues to perform invasive procedures increases, by definition,
the probability of transmission of the virus to an unacceptable
level.3 6 In this analysis, even though the risk of transmission in an
individual operation may be small, the fact that a surgeon may per-
form over 300 operations each year multiplies the opportunities for
transmission.3 7 If a seropositive 38 HCW is permitted to perform
multiple operations after being diagnosed as HIV positive, the spec-
ter of an incident causing transmission of the virus from surgeon to
patient is an increasing hazard. The court in Behringer found such a
continuing risk unacceptable, especially as transmission of this virus
results in certain death.3 9
the Medical Center's decision represented "a reasoned and informed response to the prob-
lem." Id.
35. See id. (finding that because ultimate danger to patient is death, securing informed
consent of patient combined with restrictions on performance of procedures presenting "any
risk" to patient is justified).
36. Il
37. Id. at 1283 n.20; see Ban Mishu et al.,A Surgeon with AIDS: Lack ofEvidence of Transmis-
sion to Patients, 264 JAMA 467, 467 (1990) (reporting study of Tennessee surgeon who died of
AIDS and results of state investigation of possible transmission to patients). In January 1989
a general surgeon in Tennessee was diagnosed with AIDS. Id. Mishu and his colleagues de-
veloped a study to determine whether the surgeon had transmitted the HIV virus to any of his
patients during surgery. Id First, based on the HIV virus' median incubation interval, Mishu
estimated that the surgeon may have been infected as early as 1982. Id Mishu then compiled
a list of patients on whom the surgeon had performed surgery between 1982 and 1988. Id.
There were 2160 patients identified. Id Only 1652 patients could be contacted, however. Id.
Of these patients, 616 (377o) agreed to undergo testing for the HIV virus. Id. Only one of
the 616 patients tested HIV positive, and his medical history strongly suggested that he had
contracted the virus prior to undergoing surgery. Id. Based on the study's findings, Mishu
concluded that the risk of surgeon-to-patient transmission is quite low. Id. at 470; see also
DianaJ. Schomu, Files of H.L V.-Infected Dentist To Be Transferred, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at
B 1 (reporting that New York State Health Department ordered records of dentist who died of
AIDS to be opened to determine whether any of dentist's 3060 patients had contracted HIV).
The New York Health Department came to its decision to open the dentist's files because state
investigators found evidence of poor sterilization and infection-control procedures practiced
by the dentist. Id.
38. SeeJames D. Henry, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAW 31, 35 (William H.L.
Dornette ed., 1987) (defining seropositive for HIV as meaning patient is infectious, able to
transmit virus, and blood will reveal presence of virus when tested); see also AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL AssOCIAxON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 895 (1989) (discussing use of blood testing to
ascertain presence or absence of infectious organism in bloodstream, and thus in body).
39. See Estate ofBehringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280, 1283 n.20 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Laws Div. 1991) (discussing fact that although risk to individual patient may be small,
"cumulative risk to surgical patients ... is higher" if infected surgeon continues to perform
invasive procedures). In other words, the risk to an individual patient never changes, but as
the HIV-infected HCW performs an increasing number of invasive procedures, the chance
that he or she will infect one or more of his or her patients increases.
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2. Attempts to quantify the risk of transmission from infected HCW to
patient
To date, Kimberly Bergalis and four other patients of Dr. Acer are
the only documented cases of HIV transmission from an HGW to
his or her patient.40 Nevertheless, the emerging consensus in the
medical community is that, however small, the risk of transmission
from HCW to patient is very real,4 ' and therefore, more research is
needed to determine the exact level of this risk.42 As might be ex-
pected, the debate over the actual risk of transmission centers
around those HIV-positive surgeons who perform invasive proce-
dures.43 It is these procedures that involve the highest potential for
40. Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 21, 27 (1991) (summarizing findings of follow-up inves-
tigation in Bergalis case). The investigation revealed that, in addition to Bergalis, four other
patients of Dr. Acer tested HIV positive. Id. at 21. Further, the investigation team found
evidence to support the conclusion that at least three of these patients contracted HIV from
the dentist himself. Id. at 26. The actual means of transmission in this case remains a mys-
tery. Id at 27.
41. See Letter from Nancy W. Dickey, AMA Trustee, to TheJournal of the American Medical
Association, 265JAMA 2338, 2338 (1991) [hereinafter Letter from Nancy W. Dickey] (replying
to letter from Dr. Michael M. Lederman to JAMA editor requesting that AMA withdraw its
policy advising HIV-positive doctors to avoid performing invasive procedures). In her letter,
Dickey recognizes that the risk of transmission from doctor to patient during invasive proce-
dures has not been quantified. Id. Dickey contends, however, that the risk has been con-
firmed as "a small but real one." Id Thus, Dickey asserts that "when there is a known but as
yet unquantifiable risk of patient death that is avoidable, physicians should not engage in
unnecessary procedures." Id.; see also Letter from Dr. Michael M. Lederman et al., Case West-
ern Reserve University School of Medicine, to The Journal of the American Medical Association, 265
JAMA 2337, 2337-38 (1991) [hereinafter Letter from Dr. Michael M. Lederman] (arguing that
risk of transmission from HIV-infected surgeon to patient is "not identifiable," but conceding
that it cannot be said that no risk exists). Lederman's contention is that, absent more defini-
tive data regarding the risk of transmission, the AMA should not have recommended that
HIV-infected physicians either abstain from performing invasive procedures posing an identi-
fiable risk of transmission, or inform their patients of their infection. Id.
42. See Letter from Nancy W. Dickey, supra note 41, at 2338 (stating that in order to
formulate proper guidelines, better data are needed). Dickey contends that until better data
can be acquired, "the burden of scientific uncertainty falls on the profession, not the patient."
let; see also Mishu et al., supra note 37, at 470 ("Despite the substantial size of this study, a
precise quantifiable risk to patients undergoing surgery is not yet possible. Future opportuni-
ties for similar investigations should further clarify this most important and difficult issue.").
43. See Preliminary Analysis: HIV Serosurvey of Orthopedic Surgeons, 1991, 40 MORBIITY &
MORTALITY WxLY. REP. 309, 309-10 (1991) [hereinafter HlV Serosurvey of Orthopedic Surgeons]
(attempting to determine rate of HIV infection among orthopedic surgeons, who, by defini-
tion, perform invasive procedures). The study, conducted by the CDC, summarizes findings
from a voluntary and anonymous survey of HIV status among orthopedic surgeons. Id, Out
of 3420 participants, two tested HIV seropositive (0.06%). Id. at 310-11; see also The Risk of
Contracting HIV Infection in the Course of Health Care, 265 JAMA 1872, 1872 (1991) [hereinafter
Risk of Contracting HIV] (asserting that "[t]ransmission of HIV infection from infected health
workers to patients will best be prevented by reemphasized careful and rigorous training of all
health care workers"). The article maintained that HIV-infected surgeons pose a "very low"
risk to their patients. Risk of Contracting HIV, supra, at 1872. In support of this position, the
article notes that despite 10 years of experience with HIV infection and numerous retrospec-
tive case studies on HIV-infected HCWs and their patients, there has been only one docu-
mented case of transmission of HIV infection from an HCW to a patient. Id.; Frank S. Rhame,
The HIV-Infected Surgeon, 264 JAMA 507, 507-08 (1990) ("I believe it is an essential exercise,
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the surgeon to be injured during surgery,44 causing HIV-infected
blood to enter the patient's body cavity and thereby possibly causing
inoculation.45 Percutaneous (skin-piercing) injuries where a sur-
no matter how speculative, to estimate a probability of surgeon-to-patient HIV transmission
before considering policy."). Rhame estimates the probability of transmission from surgeon
to patient at between one per 100,000 and one per million operations, although he cites no
empirical data in support of this estimation. Rhame, supra, at 507. Rhame contends that, as
long as the HIV-infected surgeon abstains from performing surgery requiring "blind, by feel
manipulation of sharp instruments ... the probability of an HIV transmission during other
types of surgery is so low that no other proscription is warranted." Id at 508.
44. Letter from Marek Szpalski, Center Hospitalier Molire Longchamp, Brussels,
Belgium, to The Journal of the American Medical Association, 266JAMA 1361, 1361 (1991) (relay-
ing results of Belgian survey of 250 surgeons and 100 anesthetists in which 63% of surgeons
and 45% of anesthesiologists reported experiencing injuries during performance of invasive
procedures within preceding three months). Szpalski contends that, given the number of in-
juries occurring in the operating room, puncture-resistant glove materials must be developed.
Id Szpalski further reports that only 26% of surgeons in the survey take the elementary pre-
caution of wearing double gloves during procedures on HIV-positive patients. Id. Further,
only 15% wore protective eyewear during such procedures. Id.
Another study found that operating room personnel are exposed to 5.6 "sharp" or "percu-
taneous" injuries (injuries that pierce the skin) per 100 procedures. See James G. Wright et
al., Mechanisms of Glove Tears and Sharp Injuries Among Surgical Personnel, 266 JAMA 1668, 1668-
71 (1991) (studying causes of glove tears and sharp injuries among operating room personnel
and determining that greatest risk of hand injury occurs "(1) when the hand is retracting
tissue and (2) when the hand is stationary and holding forceps or suture material over the
wound"). Other studies put this rate at 1.2 per 100 procedures for surgical staff. See Adelisa
L. Panlilio et al., Blood Contacts During Surgical Procedures, 265 JAMA 1533, 1536 (1991)
(describing and quantifying types of blood contact occurring during surgical procedures and
attempting to assess risk factors for such contacts). From his study, Wright found that the
sharp injuries reviewed caused bleeding in 85% of the reported incidents. Wright et al., supra,
at 1670. According to Wright, this finding contradicts previous studies suggesting that most
percutaneous exposures are "superficial." IA
Conversely, percutaneous exposure of a surgeon's blood to a patient's blood has been cal-
culated to occur in 1.7% to 4.9% of all surgical cases. Julie L. Gerberding & William P.
Schecter, Surgery and AIDS: Reducing the Risk, 265JAMA 1572, 1572 (1991). Further, the aver-
age risk of HIV transmission from patient to surgeon where a percutaneous needle stick has
occurred is estimated at between 0.3% and 0.4%. Id These ranges were derived by review-
ing results of prior studies. Id.
At least one author disagrees with these studies. See Gostin, supra note 28, at 16-23 (citing
various studies attempting to determine rates of transmission of HIV from HCWs to patients
and vice versa, and concluding that risk in either direction is too low to "justify the personal
and financial costs of systematic screening"). Gostin concludes that mandatory HIV screen-
ing of HCWs is not justified because (1) the risk of transmission would not be reduced signifi-
cantly; (2) screening would not decrease the risk; and (3) the human and economic costs of
mandatory HIV screening outweigh the benefit to be achieved. Id.
45. See Wright et al., supra note 44, at 1668-71 (discussing causes and types of exposures
from HCW to patient in operating room). Wright's study classified exposures into three
types: (1) glove tears, (2) sharp injuries, and (3) gown leaks. Id at 1669. As part of its plan in
promulgating the guidelines, the CDC chose not to include a list of invasive procedures that it
considered risky to patients when performed by HIV-infected HCWs. Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5. Instead, the CDC recommended that each hospital
or other medical institution develop its own list, reflecting the procedures performed at the
particular institution. Id In response, the nation's major medical institutions and groups
agreed to develop these lists, but after protests from members, the organizations refused to
follow the CDC recommendations. CDC Won't Dictate Rules on Health Workers, AIDS, ATLANTA
CoNsTrrtroN, June 16, 1992, at D4 (reporting that members opposed developing lists be-
cause such lists would be "medically unnecessary and scientifically unsound"). Subsequently,
the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) proposed to amend the
July 1991 guidelines, dropping the recommendation that medical groups and institutions de-
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geon's blood is released are not uncommon. 46 Moreover, many per-
cutaneous injuries occur during surgery performed blindly, or "by
feel," so that there may be no way for an HIV-positive surgeon to
know if his or her blood infected the patient.47
Some medical and legal commentators regard the Bergalis inci-
dent as a tragic yet rare occurrence. 48 These authorities maintain
that the risk of transmission is too low at present to meaningfully
quantify.49 A retrospective study done on patients of a surgeon who
died of AIDS-related symptoms and had performed invasive proce-
dures supports this view.50 The study included tests of more than
600 of the surgeon's patients and found no evidence linking the sur-
geon to HIV infection in any of the patients.5 1 Furthermore, public
health records indicate that in the seven years preceding the sur-
geon's death, none of the 2160 patients on whom the physician had
operated reported incidences of HIV infection or AIDS that could
be traced to him.52 The Bergalis incident, however, demonstrates
that such a transmission can occur. This possibility is underscored
by the fact that of roughly five million HCWs in this country, 3550,
velop these lists of at-risk procedures. See Marlene Cimons, Plan to Ease Curbs on AIDS-Infected
Doctors Is Scrapped, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at AI3 (reporting decision by federal health
officials to abandon proposal easing restrictions on AIDS-infected HCWs). This proposal was
dropped, however, after officials discovered that the newest recommendations might violate
Congress' wishes. Id Presently, no list of procedures is being considered. Id.; see also infra
notes 275-79 and accompanying text (discussing effect of stalemate between CDC and medi-
cal groups regarding compilation of at-risk procedures list).
46. See Gerberding & Schecter, supra note 44, at 1572-73 (listing rates of percutaneous
injuries among surgical staff).
47. See Rhame, supra note 43, at 507 (stating that exposure rate is strongly influenced by
type of procedure and that "blind" procedures should have higher exposure rate). One study
has shown that gynecological and trauma surgery have the highest rates of percutaneous in-
jury among surgeons per procedure. Panlilio, supra note 44, at 1534 (detailing data collected
regarding rates of percutaneous injuries experienced during various surgical procedures).
48. See Risk of Contracting HIV, supra note 43, at 1872-73 (advocating use of standardized
surgical and invasive procedural precautionary measures as sufficient means, without
mandatory HCW testing, to control spread of HIV from HCW to patient).
49. See Letter from Dr. Michael M. Lederman, supra note 41, at 2337 (arguing that risk of
transmission from HIV-positive physician is not identifiable); cf. Scott H. Isaacman, The Other
Side of the Coin: HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 439, 452 (1990)
(contending that it is virtually impossible to prove that HIV-positive HCWs do not pose threat
to patients). Isaacman states that no studies have proven that HIV-positive HCWs pose an
actual hazard to patients. Isaacman, supra, at 492. He thus calls for a resistance to blanket
policies requiring mandatory testing of HCWs until more information about the actual risk
posed is known. Id. Isaacman defends his "conservatism approach" by stating that "[o]nce
we lose the expectations of privacy and fourth amendment rights, we may experience difficulty
in trying to recover them." Id.
50. See Mishu et al., supra note 37, at 467-70 (detailing results of study of HIV-infected
surgeon and his patients).
51. See Mishu et al., supra note 37, at 467-70 (reporting that only one patient tested HIV
positive and that patient's medical history suggested that virus was not transmitted from sur-
geon). Two hundred and sixty-four of the surgeon's patients died prior to the commence-
ment of the study. Id. None of those deaths could be attributed to HIV infection. Id.
52. Mishu et al., supra note 37, at 467-70.
490
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or 0.07%, are seropositive for HIV.53
Commentators and courts, however, are in disagreement as to the
meaning of the data and the corresponding level of risk that should
be tolerated. For example, the court in Behringer adopted a zero-risk
standard 5 4 One commentator criticizes this standard as unwork-
able.5 5 This commentator argues that the "zero-tolerance" stan-
dard goes too far because it may induce discrimination against
HCWs, thereby violating federal antidiscrimination laws.5 6 This
commentator suggests that hospitals, and thus courts, should in-
stead adopt the "significant risk" standard5 7 used in these antidis-
crimination laws. 58 This author also contends that the zero-
tolerance standard is unwarranted because it would suggest that no
53. Isaacman, supra note 49, at 443 & nn.22-24. In a June 1991 survey conducted on
3420 orthopedic surgeons, all of whom performed "invasive procedures," two were HIV sero-
positive (0.06%). HIVSerosurvey of Orthopedic Surgeons, supra note 43, at 309-11. Both of these
surgeons reported having operated either on patients from a high-risk group or on patients
known to have the HIV virus or AIDS. Id Both surgeons also reported nonoccupational risk
factors for HIV infection, however. Whether transmission from patient to surgeon occurred
during an operation could therefore not be determined. Id
54. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (discussing patient-centered approach
of court in Behringer whereby any risk of transmission from HCW to patient is not tolerated);
cf. In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1297-98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (up-
holding hospital's decision to inform patients postoperatively of HCW's HIV infection based
on risk of transmission, however slight). The Pennsylvania court added, "Dr. Doe's medical
problem was not merely his. It became a public concern the moment he picked up a surgical
instrument and became a part of a team involved in invasive procedures." Id (emphasis omit-
ted). By this statement, the court adopted the patient-centered approach articulated by the
New Jersey court in Behringer. See id at 1297-99 (articulating theory of patient-centered ap-
proach to medicine and its application where AIDS is involved).
55. See Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136-37 (criticizing decision in Behringer).
56. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1135. According to Orentlicher, the "zero tolerance"
risk standard violates the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. He claims that the Act would
protect HCWs from discrimination based on their HIV status unless the HCWs' infections
posed a "significant risk" to their patients. Id.; see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101(3), 103(b), 104 Stat. 327, 330, 334 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111, 12113) (using "significant risk" standard as threshold test for violations of antidis-
crimination provisions of statute). Moreover, he says studies have failed to prove that HIV-
infected HCWs pose a "significant risk" to their patients. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1135.
57. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136; see also Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care
ProfessionaL- Public Policy, Discrimination, and Patient Safety, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 303,
307-08 (1990) (contending that "significant risk" standard is more reasonable given present-
day infection control procedures and assessments of other risks inherent in medical
environment).
58. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29
(1988) (amending Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1990), by incorporating "sig-
nificant risk" standard into Act); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, §§ 101(2), 103(b), 104 Stat. 327, 330, 334 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111,
12113) (stating that fact that qualified individual with disability poses "significant risk to
health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation" may be
defense to charge of discrimination).
Both Professor Gostin and Professor Barnes cite the opinion in School Board v. Arline as the
Supreme Court's adoption of the "significant risk" standard. Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-
Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Policies and Public Health, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 311, 316 (1990); Gostin, supra note 57, at 307.
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level of risk is acceptable, but, given present research, it remains
unclear whether the actual risk of transmission has reached such a
threshold level to invoke the significant risk standard, let alone the
zero-tolerance one.
59
In 1988, the New York State Legislature adopted this significant
risk standard and directed the state's Department of Health to de-
fine "significant risk."60 The department's definition of the phrase
did not include instances in which proper infection control/barrier
practices were being used.6 1 Consequently, the definition permitted
infected HCWs to continue to perform invasive procedures as long
as the medical institution established proper infection-control
59. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136.
60. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2786(1) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (providing that "(t]he
Commissioner... shall promulgate regulations to identify those circumstances which create
significant risk of contracting, or transmitting HIV"); see also N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REG'S. tit.
10, § 63.9 (1992) (defining "significant risk" in context of HIV transmission). Under the New
York State Official Compilation of Codes, Rules, and Regulations, three factors are necessary
to create a significant risk of contracting or transmitting the HIV virus: "(1) the presence of a
significant risk body substance; (2) a circumstance which constitutes significant risk for trans-
mitting or contracting HIV infection; and (3) the presence of an infectious source and a
noninfected person." N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63.9(a) (1992). "Significant
risk body substances" are defined as "blood, semen, vaginal secretions, breast milk, tissue and
the following body fluids: cerebrospinal, amniotic, peritoneal, synovial, pericardial, and pleu-
ral." Id § 63.9(b). Further, circumstances constituting a "significant risk of transmitting or
contracting HIV infection" include:
(1) sexual intercourse (vaginal, anal, oral) which exposes a noninfected individual to
blood, semen or vaginal secretions of an infected individual; (2) sharing of needles
and other paraphernalia used for preparing and injecting drugs between infected
and noninfected individuals; (3) the gestation, birthing or breast feeding of an infant
when the mother is infected with HIV; (4) transfusion or transplantation of blood,
organs, or other tissues from an infected individual to an uninfected individual, pro-
vided such blood, organs or other tissues have not tested negatively for antibody or
antigen and have not been rendered noninfective by heat or chemical treatment; (5)
other circumstances not identified in paragraphs (1) through (4) of this subdivision
during which a significant risk body substance (other than breast milk) of an infected
individual contacts mucous membranes (e.g., eyes, nose, mouth), nonintact skin (e.g.,
open wound, skin with a dermatitis condition, abraded areas) or the vascular system
of a noninfected person. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to needle-
stick or puncture wound injuries and direct saturation or permeation of these body
surfaces by the infectious body substance.
Id § 63.9(c). The New York State Legislature adopted the standard after New York courts
experienced difficulty in determining what level of risk warranted the exclusion of HIV-in-
fected HCWs from employment. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 315-16 (discussing deriva-
tion of New York State Department of Health's "significant risk" definition).
61. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63.9 (1992). The regulatory definition states
that circumstances involving a significant risk do not include:
(1) exposure to urine, feces, sputum, nasal secretions, saliva, sweat, tears or vomitus
that does not contain blood that is visible to the naked eye; (2) human bites where
there is no direct blood to blood, or blood to mucous membrane contact; (3) expo-
sure of intact skin to blood or any other substance; or (4) occupational settings where
individuals use scientifically accepted barrier techniques and preventive practices in circumstances
which would otherwise pose a significant risk.
Id § 63.9(d) (emphasis added).
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procedures.
62
Despite the inconclusiveness of the data regarding the rate of
transmission of the HIV virus from an infected HCW to his or her
patient, the law should not ignore the possibility of transmission.
Indeed, the need for a legal framework will increase as the number
of infected HCWs rises corresponding to the general population. 63
To address this need, common law concepts provide viable mecha-
nisms to guide the medical and legal communities.
B. Common Law Creation of a Duty for Mandatory HIV Testing
Mandatory testing of individuals, with or without particularized
suspicion,64 is not a new practice in this country. 65 Courts have up-
held the use of mandatory testing in a variety of circumstances, in-
cluding examinations of blood-alcohol levels of persons arrested for
drunk driving,66 whether drugs or alcohol played a role in railroad
accidents, 67 evidence of drug use in connection with job promotion
62. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 316 (noting that New York's final version of defini-
tion essentially allows HIV-positive HCWs to work unrestricted as long as they are competent
in infection-control procedures, not epidemiologically linked to any previous incident of
transmission, and functionally able to perform medical procedures at issue).
63. See Heterosexual Contact Accounts for Most New HIV Cases, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 13, 1992, at
A10 (reporting that World Health Organization (WHO) estimates number of AIDS cases oc-
curring since early 1980s stands at approximately two million). According to the WHO, the
number of persons currently infected by the AIDS virus is between 10 to 12 million. Id. The
organization predicts that this number will increase to between 30 and 40 million by the year
2000. Id.
64. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,232, 233-34 (1984) (defining "particularized suspi-
cion" as whether there is either cause or "reasonable grounds for believing that [a] person is
involved in some unlawful activity" and holding that INS policy of indiscriminate questioning
of all Hispanic factory employees to find illegal aliens is unconstitutional).
65. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-77
(1989) (upholding mandatory drug testing for U.S. Customs Service agents where agents
were applying for promotion to jobs involving drug interdiction and carrying of firearms);
Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
mandatory testing of nuclear plant employees for presence of illegal drugs as part of safety
program); Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427, 435-36 (Wash.
1988) (upholding testing program similar to that in Rushton), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989).
66. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (finding possibility of
blood-alcohol level decreasing after short period of time justifies search due to threat of de-
struction of evidence); see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448-55
(1990) (upholding use of highway checkpoints for sobriety tests of drivers).
67. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,630-34 (1989) (uphold-
ing Federal Railroad Administration regulations requiring testing for drugs and alcohol, even
in absence of individualized suspicion, in blood of certain employees involved in "safety-sen-
sitive tasks" following certain specified events such as major train accidents).
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procedures, 68 and indeed, the presence of the HIV virus. 69 As a
rule, mandatory testing must pass constitutional muster before it
will be upheld.
1. Constitutional analysis of mandatory HIV testing
Generally, mandatory testing implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment's 70 search and seizure clause.7 1 Similar to developments in
the criminal arena, 72 courts have devised a Fourth Amendment bal-
ancing test that weighs the intrusion of mandatory testing on an in-
dividual's Fourth Amendment interests 73 against the promotion of
legitimate or compelling state interests. 74 In determining the de-
68. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-79 (1989)
(permitting Customs Service to require urinalysis of employees seeking transfer or promotion
to positions involving drug interdiction or carrying of firearms, but remanding case for fur-
ther findings of fact where handling classified material was condition of such transfer or pro-
motion, although maintaining that testing may be justified in such instances where truly
sensitive material is handled); see also Harmen v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 491-93 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (sanctioning random drug testing of Department of Justice employees with access to
classified information but not random testing for all federal prosecutors and employees with
access to grand jury proceedings), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
69. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195-97 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding AIDS testing
of federal prisoners), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); see also Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 53-55 (D.D.C. 1987) (upholding
State Department policy of mandatory AIDS testing for all employees being sent overseas in
order to test fitness for duty, not to control spread of AIDS).
70. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (providing, in pertinent part, that "(t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated").
71. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (rejecting notion that constitu-
tional concerns of mandatory testing center on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege,
but rather "plainly involve[] the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment"). The Court in Schmerber held that the Fifth Amendment only protects a
defendant from having to testify or "otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial
or communicative nature" against him or herself. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761. The forced
withdrawal of blood, the Court stated, was not within the scope of this protection. Id.
"[C]ompulsion which makes a suspect or the accused the source of'real or physical evidence'
does not violate [the Fifth Amendment's privilege]." Id. at 764; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
665 (holding that mandatory drug testing program is subject to Fourth Amendment analysis).
72. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-48 (1985) (balancing student's ex-
pectation of privacy in her purse against school officials' interest in preventing distribution of
illegal drugs on school grounds).
73. Fourth Amendment interests are those interests that relate to an individual's expec-
tations of privacy. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (discussing Buie's
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in rooms police had not searched before his
arrest); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (discussing balancing of "employees'
legitimate expectations of privacy against the government (employer's] need for supervision,
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace"); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 338
(1987) (suggesting that balancing of governmental interests and Fourth Amendment privacy
interests supports "reasonable-suspicion standard for the cursory examination of items in
plain view").
74. This balancing test was first articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967) (stating that there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails"). In Camara, the Court stated that to enforce minimum standards for housing codes,
"routine periodic inspections" were required. Id. at 535-36. These decisions to inspect are
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gree of intrusiveness caused by the state, courts look to the nature
of the state action that the individual must endure. Examples of
state action include requiring the individual to undergo question-
ing, detention, urinalysis, or the taking of blood.75 Courts deter-
mine whether the interests of the state are legitimate by considering
elements such as the purpose of the program,76 whether the pro-
gram is limited in scope,77 and the program's effectiveness. 78 More
specifically, mandatory testing falls within the subcategory of Fourth
Amendment law known as administrative searches. 79
not based on a specific building's characteristics, but rather on the characteristics of an entire
area. Id. at 536. In order to search private property, however, a warrant must be obtained.
Id. at 538-39. It is here that the balancing test is applied. Id. at 539. If the anticipated intru-
sion is reasonable, that is, if a "valid public interest" exists, then there is probable cause for a
warrant to be issued. lId
The Supreme Court also employed this balancing test in the criminal context in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968), to develop a theory of reasonable suspicion to permit frisking
for concealed weapons. The Court held that this type of search is justified for the protection
of police officers and nearby people and must be confined to the discovery of weapons that
would lead to assault. l at 29.
These cases provide the groundwork for the requirement that the government's mandatory
testing program must be "sufficiently productive" to justify intrusion on Fourth Amendment
protections. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673
(1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979)) (finding that Delaware's ran-
dom spot check program did not sufficiently aid in control of drunken driving to justify use of
such coercive testing system under Fourth Amendment).
75. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-32 (1989) (permit-
ting Federal Railroad Administration to obtain employee blood and urine samples to test for
presence of drugs or alcohol absent particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use); Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 665-66 (holding that Customs Service may require employees to submit to urinal-
ysis before promotion to "sensitive positions within the Service" without particularized suspi-
cion of drug use). But see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-93 (1979) (requiring
particularized suspicion to search individuals for concealed weapons when executing search
warrant). The Court in Ybarra found that the Terry reasonableness analysis was not satisfied
because police had searched individuals not mentioned in the warrant without any apparent
danger to the police from these individuals. Id at 93-94.
76. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622-24 (concluding that state regulations are legitimate be-
cause they were designed to establish whether railroad employees are under influence of
drugs or alcohol at time of particular accident, not to prosecute individuals for drug or alco-
hol use while on job).
77. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (finding that employee's seeking of promotion to
sensitive job automatically triggers requirement that employee undergo urinalysis testing, so
there is no need to obtain warrant prior to testing because scope of testing is already limited
to persons seeking such employment and is not subject to employer's discretionary determi-
nation); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22 (finding that warrant would not further aim of having
narrow and specific intrusions on employee privacy in use of urinalysis testing because regula-
tions defining such intrusions were already narrow and specific); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 758, 770-71 (1966) (permitting extraction of blood for blood-alcohol test without
warrant when petitioner was being treated for injuries at hospital after being arrested for
drunk driving).
78. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629-30 (concluding that Fourth Amendment intrusion effec-
tively deterred employees from alcohol and drug use while on job, provided valuable informa-
tion of causes of train accidents, and protected public safety); see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676
(determining that drug testing for promotions "bears a close and substantial relation to the
Service's goal of deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sensitive positions").
79. See generally Steven T. Wax, The Fourth Amendment, Administrative Searches and the Loss of
Liberty, 18 ENmrT. L. 911, 919-22 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court's approval of warrantless
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2. Mandatory testing as administrative search
Many governmental searches conducted as part of an administra-
tive plan have withstood judicial scrutiny. Courts have allowed drug
testing for certain classes of employees,80 in job hiring and promo-
tion,81 and following railroad accidents.8 2 The Supreme Court's
holding in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab8 solidified
the legal standards for administrative searches. In Von Raab, union-
ized employees of the U.S. Customs Service brought suit to enjoin
the Service from testing certain employees for the presence of
drugs.8 4 The Service's testing program covered employees seeking
promotions or transfers to positions involving the direct interdic-
tion of illegal drugs, carrying of firearms, or having access to sensi-
tive information.85 The union argued that the drug-testing plan
constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 6 The district court agreed, finding the service's plan
overly intrusive because it was predicated on a lack of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion,87 and therefore violated the employ-
ees' expectations of privacy.8 8
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the Customs Service's test-
ing program.89 In doing so, the Court held that the program, as a
administrative searches); Lynn S. Searle, Note, The "Administrative" Searchfiom Dewey to Bur-
ger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 267-68 (1989) (claiming
that Supreme Court's rationale for warrantless administrative searches has failed to "de-
velop[] and defin[e] consistent criteria," and that "[i]ts decisions... have dealt with cases on
an ad hoc basis").
80. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610-15 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (upholding drug testing of civilian employees of U.S. military who work in critical job
designations), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 490-
96 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding drug testing of Department of Justice employees with top
secret national clearances but not testing of all criminal prosecutors or employees with access
to grand jury proceedings).
81. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-79 (1989)
(upholding drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to posi-
tions directly involved with drug interdiction and use of firearms and, in general, upholding
testing of employees with access to classified information).
82. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 630-34 (1989) (uphold-
ing testing of railroad employees for presence of drugs and/or alcohol following train acci-
dents or other incidents).
83. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
84. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989).
85. Id at 660-61.
86. Id at 663.
87. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La.
1986) (holding that "dragnet approach" to drug testing at workplace without reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause is "overly intrusive and constitutionally infirm"), vacated, 816 F.2d
170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
88. Id at 387.
89. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989) (vacat-
ing and remanding part of judgment upholding testing of applicants for positions that re-
quired handling classified materials).
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search, must meet the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness require-
ment.90 While a search generally must be preceded by the issuance
of a warrant, the Court stated that this was not always necessary. 91
Instead, it employed a balancing test to measure the relative impor-
tance of an individual's expectations of privacy versus the govern-
ment's interests, where the government's interest was beyond
"normal" law enforcement needs.92 The Court questioned whether
a warrant based on individualized suspicion was required and
whether it was impractical in this situation.93 Furthermore, the
Court held that the Service's interest in ensuring that employees in-
volved in drug interdiction are beyond reproach in integrity and
judgment was a compelling one.94 In balancing this compelling in-
terest against the degree of state intrusion, the Court found the
level of intrusion sufficiently narrow and specific because adminis-
tering officials work with limited discretion.95 By balancing the
compelling interest of the government with this limited degree of
intrusion, the Court determined that the drug-testing program was
reasonable and rationally related to the goal of ensuring the quality
of the Service's agents. 96 Moreover, the Court found that employ-
ees requesting transfers or promotions to these "at-risk" positions
should expect to be subjected to certain "operational realities,"
thereby resulting in a diminished expectation of privacy.
97
Generally, as articulated by Von Raab, when reviewing administra-
tive searches that include mandatory testing programs, courts must
undertake a balancing test that weighs the individual's expectation
of privacy and a program's level of intrusiveness against the govern-
mental interests that conflict with those expectations. 98 To warrant
testing, there must be a clear nexus between the scope of an individ-
90. It at 665. Reasonableness depends on the circumstances of the case. Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
91. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
92. Id.
93. It at 665-66 (positing that purpose of program is to stop promotion of drug users to
sensitive positions and arguing that fact that test results cannot be used in criminal prosecu-
tion "justifties] departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements").
94. Id at 670 (maintaining that nation's interest in protecting itself against drug traffick-
ing could be "irreparably damaged" if Customs' officers were "unsympathetic to their mission
of interdicting drugs").
95. Id. at 667 (finding that every employee seeking promotion or transfer knows of drug
testing policy and procedures so that warrant would serve no real purpose).
96. Id. at 679. The Court, however, found that, while testing of employees with access to
classified information is not in itself objectionable, the Customs Service's testing program was
not shown to test only such employees. The Court therefore remanded the case for proceed-
ings "to clarify the scope of this category of employees subject to testing." Itt at 677-78.
97. itt at 671.
98. Id at 665-66 (finding that testing program's purpose of stopping promotion of drug
users to sensitive positions justifies abandonment of normal warrant requirement).
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ual's responsibilities and the danger posed to the government by a
compromised employee.99 Furthermore, policy considerations may
compel administrative searches where the government seeks to
prevent the creation of a dangerous situation' 00 that could not be
effectively addressed if an individualized suspicion were necessary to
authorize testing prior to every search. 10 ' This point is germane to
mandatory testing for AIDS in certain specific and defined situa-
tions.
Courts have upheld mandatory testing for the presence of AIDS
in two instances. First, courts sustain mandatory testing for the
AIDS virus for prisoners as a routine precaution prior to incarcera-
tion.102 In Dunn v. White,10 3 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit used the balancing approach articulated in Von Raab to uphold
this type of testing program.10 4 In applying the balancing test, the
court weighed the security interests of a prison against a prisoner's
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.105 The court required that
there be a " 'valid, rational connection' " between the governmental
interest at stake and the means proffered to protect that interest. 
1 06
99. See Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declaring that
Department of Justice testing program, without additional tailoring of program's scope,
lacked sufficient nexus to its goals under Von Raab).
100. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1989)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059
(1990).
101. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1193 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 613-17 (1989)).
102. See Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1195-97 (determining that mandatory AIDS test of incarcerated
prisoners to control spread of disease is reasonable search under Fourth Amendment).
103. 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990).
104. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
"prison's substantial interest [in preventing spread of AIDS] outweighs plaintiff's expectation
of privacy"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-30
(1984) (employing similar Fourth Amendment balancing test to uphold prison administration
use of random cell searches); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding body
cavity searches of federal prisoners as reasonable under Fourth Amendment balancing test).
105. See Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194-95 (stating that routine blood testing procedure was lim-
ited intrusion on prisoner's privacy and that prisoner's privacy interest is further reduced by
incarceration, and that "attempt to ascertain the extent of [AIDS] problem is certainly a legiti-
mate penological purpose"). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit similarly con-
cluded that the prevalence of drug use in prisons warranted the drug testing of prisoners.
Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986). But cf. Berry v. District of Columbia, 833
F.2d 1031, 1035-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding case to determine whether drug testing of
prisoners as condition of pretrial release is related either to prisoner's commission of crimes
or failure to appear for scheduled hearings). The court in Dunn distinguished Bery by the fact
that if the inmates refused to undergo drug testing, they would remain in custody, and there-
fore, testing had no impact on detention. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1192. In addition, prison officials
in Berry reasoned that drug testing would prevent the release of those prisoners at risk to
society or that presented a flight risk while waiting for trial. Berry, 833 F.2d at 1035. Because
there was not a sufficient factual connection between the means and purpose of the drug
testing program in Berry, it was invalidated until more fact finding could be done. Id at 1034.
106. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)). Fur-
thermore, the court of appeals in Dunn rejected the argument that a prison HIV testing pro-
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In other words, for the testing plan to be rendered valid in Dunn, the
use of a blood test to detect HIV infection had to be rationally re-
lated to the prevention and spreading of AIDS in the prison
community.'
07
The court in Dunn also upheld the HIV testing plan because the
plan's routine implementation of mandatory HIV testing met the re-
quirements of an administrative search.'0 8 Although the circum-
stances litigated in Dunn arose in a criminal context, the
administrative search balancing test applies equally in the civil con-
text. 10 9 In Dunn, the court found that the governmental interest in
preventing the spread of AIDS, coupled with the prisoner's dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, 1° were sufficiently strong and com-
pelling factors to sustain mandatory testing. "'1 The court, however,
went a step further. It maintained that the government's interest in
general public health may be strong enough to allow similar
searches of "free world residents."1 2
In particular, the court noted its 1973 decision in Reynolds v. Mc-
Nichols, 313 where it upheld the City of Denver's power to test prosti-
tutes for venereal diseases even though the prostitutes were neither
gram required individualized suspicion. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196. As the prison had a
"substantial interest" in AIDS prevention, no requirement of individualized suspicion was
necessary. I at 1196-97. In addition, the court suggested that a requirement of individual-
ized suspicion would render the program inoperative. Cf. id. at 1193 (relying on Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989), for proposition that nature of
government's interest makes individualized suspicion, based on warrant requirement,
unnecessary).
107. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196-97 (explaining that although allegations were made that
prison lacked "current medical response" to AIDS epidemic, allegations would not control
prison's collection of information for future action, because "[t]he prison will ultimately bear
responsibility for decisions on segregation and treatment, and certainly it is reasonable [for
the prison operators] to attempt to avoid making such decisions in a vacuum").
108. See id. at 1193 (relying on elements enunciated in Von Raab denoting routine adminis-
trative function designed to prevent hazardous conditions in work environment); see also supra
notes 93-96 (discussing Von Raab elements).
109. See id. (concluding that administrative searches, whether ultimate governmental
objectives are either civil or criminal, must still be analyzed by balancing level of governmen-
tal intrusion against privacy interests of individual); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
723-26 (1987) (upholding work-related searches of employee offices generally after balancing
government's interests in workplace against employee's privacy expectations in workplace);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73, 375 (1987) (upholding governmental interest in
conducting inventory search of automobiles before impoundment against individual's dimin-
ished expectation of privacy as long as search conducted according to standardized
procedures).
110. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing fact that incar-
ceration reduces prisoner's "privacy expectation in his [or her] body"), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990).
111. Id. at 1195 (asserting that attempt to learn extent of AIDS infection in prisons is
"legitimate penological purpose").
112. Id. (suggesting that under certain circumstances, public health concerns may justify
mandatory blood testing within suspicious class of citizens).
113. 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
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under arrest nor individually suspected of being infected with such
diseases. 1 4 Nevertheless, the court in Dunn held that controlling
the spread of venereal disease may be compelling enough to allow
"coerced medical testing" of those within a suspected class." 15 Indi-
vidualized suspicion is not required,' 16 although the court required
the state to show that the search, in this case the blood test, was a
"'".."sufficiently productive mechanism to justify [its] intrusion upon
Fourth Amendment interests." ' "117 The court in Dunn held that
the mandatory HIV testing of prisoners met this "sufficiently pro-
ductive mechanism" test.118
In the second case, a federal district court upheld mandatory HIV
testing outside of the criminal context. In Local 1812, American Feder-
ation of Government Employees v. United States Department of State, 19 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a State De-
partment policy that provided for routine HIV testing of foreign
service professionals selected to serve overseas. 20 The employees'
union challenged the Department's policy as an unreasonable
search.' 2 1 After investigation, the court found that because the
State Department added the HIV test to an already existing policy
whose purpose was to establish general fitness for duty and em-
114. Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating that it is rea-
sonable for city to attempt to control known source of venereal disease). In a somewhat
analogous situation, the mandatory immunization of children has been held constitutional.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (suggesting that parent's authority over
child is limited where state seeks to protect child and community from communicable dis-
ease);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905) (holding that Massachusetts was
justified in attempting to protect health of citizens through compulsory vaccination program).
115. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that even if threat
of AIDS is no greater in prison than in general population, "prison's strong interest in deter-
mining who in the population currently carries AIDS" would not be significantly weakened),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990).
116. Id at 1195-96.
117. Id. at 1196 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
673 (1989) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979))).
118. Id. (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-59)). The
court was constrained to view the facts of the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
Thus, the court assumed that the prison was not responding to the AIDS information it gath-
ered. Id. The court held, however, that because the prison would eventually make decisions
on the management of prisoners with AIDS, it was reasonable for prison administrators to be
informed when making these choices. Id. It further stated that according to Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), the scope, conduct, and justification of a particular intrusion are
relevant in "balancing the prison's need against plaintiff's interest .... " Dunn, 880 F.2d at
1196-97. The court found, however, that the plaintiff did not "allege that the manner or place
of the test was unreasonable," and therefore, the issue was reduced to whether AIDS testing,
in itself, was a violation of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that such
testing was not. Id. at 1197.
119. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
120. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.
Supp. 50, 53-54 (D.D.C. 1987).
121. See id. at 53 (arguing, additionally, that State Department's policy violated Fifth
Amendment due process and federal discrimination laws).
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ployee health protection while serving abroad,1 22 the addition of the
HIV test created a means to ensure fitness of duty and was a rational
way to reach that goal.' 23 The court therefore refused to enjoin the
State Department from implementing the testing program.'
24
Governmental interests in HIV testing, however, have not always
survived judicial scrutiny. A federal district court employed the
Fourth Amendment balancing test to strike down mandatory HIV
testing of state employees who supervise retarded patients in the
state's care. In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retarda-
tion,125 the State of Nebraska had instituted a mandatory HIV testing
program for staff members after two patients tested positive for the
virus and after a staff member died from AIDS-related complica-
tions. 126 The testing policy itself applied to all employees whose
positions "involve[d] extensive contact" with patients that might
lead to injuries that could possibly draw infected blood.
127
The district court's application of the balancing test weighed the
employees' reasonable expectations of privacy against the state
agency's interest in a safe living environment for the patients in its
care.' 28 After determining that the involuntary blood test consti-
tuted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 129 the
court in Glover balanced the competing interests to determine
whether the mandatory test met a reasonableness standard.'30 Be-
cause there was no medical evidence linking casual contact, such as
122. See ida at 52-53 (articulating concerns about lack of proper medical care for AIDS
patients abroad and higher rates of infectious diseases in foreign countries as factors motivat-
ing adoption of State Department policy).
123. Id. at 53.
124. E (finding present record insufficient to justify injunction based on likelihood that
constitutional claim would prevail).
125. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
126. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.
Neb. 1988), af'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. In addition, the court stated that while there was some evidence of sexual abuse
of clients at the centers, there was no evidence of a sexual abuse problem, and therefore, the
court did not examine what affect this would have on its holding. Id at 248.
128. Id. at 250 (acknowledging that court must not "over-react and permit unreasonable
invasions into a carefully formulated and preserved constitutional right as a response to this
concern" about AIDS).
129. Id.; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-71 (1966) (holding that blood test
constitutes Fourth Amendment search and seizure, but may be reasonable where suspect is
arrested for drunk driving).
130. Clover, 686 F. Supp. at 250. There are other examples of ways in which this balanc-
ing test is applied. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (maintaining that stan-
dard requires that goal and scope of intrusion are both reasonable); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 703-10 (1983) (weighing nature and extent of intrusion against individual's
Fourth Amendment rights where suspect was stopped at airport on suspicion of carrying con-
traband and finding that brief stop would be reasonable but that length of time of this particu-
lar stop was unreasonable); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967)
(balancing need to search buildings, which has "long history of judicial and public accept-
ance," and public interest to prevent "dangerous conditions" against "relatively limited inva-
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the care performed by the state employees, to HIV transmission, the
court struck down the mandatory testing policy.1 31 Furthermore,
the court found that while the state's desire to protect its patients
and employees from HIV infection was a worthy goal, the plan to
accomplish that goal did not "reasonably serve that purpose."'132
The differences between the factual context of the mandatory
HIV testing program in Glover and the "at-risk" procedures focused
on by this Comment lead to a conclusion that the constitutionality of
mandatory HIV testing of those HCWs who perform at-risk proce-
dures remains an open question. The holding in Glover does not
proscribe all mandatory HIV testing programs, but remains fact spe-
cific. It is conceivable, therefore, that a mandatory HIV testing pro-
gram in a different factual context will be able to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment balancing test as applied to administrative searches. 33
The prison cases discussed above lead to such a conclusion. In-
deed, the court in Dunn suggested the point that, under the proper
circumstances, mandatory HIV testing outside of the criminal con-
text may withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 3 4 An institutional HIV
testing program has yet to be challenged in the courts, however.
Interestingly, though, in response to the CDC guidelines examined
by this Comment, many state legislatures have called for mandatory
testing of HCWs.' 3 5 The issue, therefore, may soon come directly
before the courts.
3. Creation of a duty to test HCWs
a. School Board v. Arline: Section 504 mandates inquiry into
health condition of employees
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973136 prohibits dis-
sion of the urban citizen's privacy" in determining whether warrant must be obtained for such
search).
131. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 250-51.
132. Id. at 251. The state's policy was premised on the belief that it had a responsibility to
"protect [patients] at all costs." Id. The court disagreed because the state acted with "little or
erroneous medical knowledge," thereby impermissibly violating the constitutional rights of
the employees. Id.
133. See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text (discussing administrative searches).
134. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (suggesting that governmental interests
may be so compelling as to permit mandatory HIV testing outside criminal environment).
135. See Del. H.B. 191, 136th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1991) (enacted) (amending
title 16 of Delaware Code to add new chapter 29 requiring testing of HGWs for AIDS); Fla.
H.B. 111, Reg. Sess. (1992) (proposed) (establishing program to test health care providers for
HIV); Mich. H.B. 5062, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991) (proposed) (providing periodic AIDS
testing for certain health care professionals); NJ. S.B. 3588, 204th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1991)
(proposed) (supplementing chapter 16C of title 26 of Revised Statutes to require mandatory
HIV testing of all HCWs who may be exposed to another person's body fluids).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796(i) (1988).
[Vol. 42:479
1993] HIV TESTING OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS
crimination against handicapped persons who are employed by gov-
ernment or who are working for private employers that receive
federal aid or assistance.' 37 The statute requires that an employer
refrain from using a person's handicap as a basis for denying em-
ployment opportunities if the person is "otherwise qualified" to per-
form thejob. 3 8 The Court in School Board v. Arline 13 9 examined this
antidiscrimination provision.' 40
In Arline, the county school board forced an elementary school
teacher to resign after she suffered a series of tuberculosis re-
lapses. 41 In response, the teacher brought suit in federal court al-
leging that her discharge violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 142 The Supreme Court agreed with the teacher, holding that
tuberculosis is a disease, and therefore is covered under section
504.143 Moreover, the Court unequivocally concluded that a conta-
gious disease constitutes a "handicap" for purposes of section
504.144 In so concluding, the Court found that if a handicapped
party is "otherwise qualified" to perform a job, or if reasonable ac-
commodations could be made to allow that person to continue to
work in a related capacity, then the person may not be discharged
on the basis of the handicap.' 45 In applying this standard, employ-
137. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
138. Section 504 provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States ... shall, solely, by reason of his [or her] handicap, be excluded from participation in,
be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance .. " Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 87 Stat. at 394 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794). A "handicapped" individual under this provision is "any
person who ... has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
major life activities.... has a record of such an impairment, or ... is regarded as having such
an impairment." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1991). A "qualified handicapped person" means,
"[w]ith respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the job in question." Id. § 84.3(k)(1).
A person who has a contagious disease may not be considered "handicapped" for purposes
of § 504 where he or she is an
individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of
such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection,
is unable to perform the duties of the job.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C) (1988).
139. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
140. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987).
141. Id. at 276.
142. Ia
143. Id at 284-86.
144. Id. at 282, 285-86. The Court stated that "[a]llowing discrimination based on the
contagious effects of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
§ 504 .... " Id. at 284.
145. Id at 287-88. The case was remanded to determine whether the teacher was "other-
wise qualified" for her job or if reasonable accommodations could be made so that she could
continue teaching. Id at 277. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979), the Court discussed whether a woman with a hearing impairment who had to rely on
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ers must "conduct an individualized inquiry" of employees, and
should defer to the "reasonable medical judgments of public health
officials" when making the requisite findings of fact.146 Accordingly,
this holding suggests that a medical institution employer, as part of
its "individualized inquiry" into an employee's health, would need
to know the status of the employee's disease if the employer is to
make reasonable accommodations for that employee. ' 47 It follows,
therefore, that to correctly determine an employee's suitability for
continued employment, HIV testing of that individual may be
required.
b. HIV testing of HCWs required under affirmative duty to provide
safe work environment
Two recent cases place a prospective duty on health care institu-
tions to know the HIV status of their HCWs, thus compelling, by
implication, the use of individualized mandatory testing. In Leckelt
lipreading to understand speech was otherwise qualified to take part in a nursing training
program, and whether the college had to make reasonable accommodations for her. Id. at
405-12. The Court stated that it was undisputed that the respondent could only participate in
the nursing program if standards were "substantially lowered," and it held that § 504 did not
require such "substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person."
lId at 413. The Court wrote that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet
all of a program's requirements in spite of his [or her] handicap." Id. at 406. That is, if the
handicapped person can perform "the essential functions" of the position, then that person is
"otherwise qualified." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1991). If the handicapped person is attempt-
ing to gain admission into a postsecondary school, he or she cannot be denied admission ifhe
or she meets the required "academic and technical standards." Id. § 84.3(k)(3).
"Reasonable accommodation" of a handicapped person includes: making facilities accessi-
ble to such persons, job restructuring, part-time work, or other modified work schedules. Id.
§ 84.12(b). The necessary accommodation cannot, however, impose "undue financial and
administrative burdens" or require "a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program."
Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 410, 412; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (promulgating
regulations quoted in Southeastern Community College). Where "reasonable accommodations"
cannot be made, the failure to hire, promote, admit, or otherwise reconcile the special needs
of a handicapped person does not constitute discrimination. See Southeastern Community College,
442 U.S. at 410-13 (refusing to demand that nursing college undergo undue hardship to ac-
commodate handicapped student); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 280, 299-301 (1985)
(discussing logic of Southeastern Community College case); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716
F.2d 227, 231-34 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing fact that § 504 does not "guarantee the handi-
capped equal results from the provision of state Medicaid" and that accommodations for
handicapped are unnecessary because equal access exists).
Based on the elements of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court in Arline ultimately
found that "reasonable accommodations" for the employee would not mean placing a teacher
who is contagious for tuberculosis in a classroom with children. School ld. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987).
146. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 288; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing
AMA's formula for determining risk of transmission for contagious diseases in health care
context, which seems to suggest similar type of inquiry).
147. Cf Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16 (stressing that employee who poses "significant risk"
of transmitting infectious disease in workplace will not "otherwise qualifly]" for his or herjob
if reasonable accommodations cannot eliminate risk of transmission).
504
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v. Board of Commissioners,148 the court found that a hospital had an
affirmative duty to provide a " 'safe environment, and safeguard[]
the health of all patients and employees.' 149 The court inferred
this duty from the hospital's routine use of infection-control proce-
dures and requirements intended to prevent the transmission of
contagious diseases between patients and HCWs. °50 Accordingly,
when an employee contracts a contagious disease or is suspected to
be at risk of contracting such a disease, the hospital must reassign or
restrict as necessary the operators and procedures that employee
may perform.' 5' The hospital's ability to exercise this duty, how-
ever, is contingent upon it obtaining information regarding each
employee's health. Therefore, in Leckelt, the health care institution
had to know whether its employee was HIV positive,15 2 information
that comes only from administering an HIV test.
53
In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center,'54 the Superior Court of New
Jersey ruled that a physician has an affirmative duty to withdraw
from performing invasive procedures that pose risks to patients.' 55
The court justified its adoption of this rule by relying on section 293
148. 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
149. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1989) (quoting from
hospital's infection control procedures), aftd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
150. See id. at 1377, 1388, 1392 (finding that it is reasonable under circumstances to re-
quire testing of employees exposed to infectious diseases in order to control spread of such
diseases). Therefore, testing for HIV infection falls under the rubric of these procedures. Id-
at 1379.
151. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1388-89. The Supreme Court's holding in School Board v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), provided the justification, according to the court in Leckelt, for
the hospital to investigate the health status of an employee to determine if "reasonable ac-
commodations" are possible or not. See Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1388 (concluding that Arline
required health care institutions to investigate health of employees who are suspected of car-
rying contagious diseases). Absent such information, the hospital could not know what ac-
commodations are "reasonable." Id. This knowledge is needed for both the benefit of
patients coming into contact with the infected employee and for the employee's health. See id.
at 1388 (concluding that infected employee stands at risk if treating patients infected with
highly contagious diseases).
152. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1382, 1388. The court drew support from Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), for the principle that employers must sometimes dis-
criminate against an employee based on his or her handicap where the performance of certain
job-related tasks would expose the handicapped individual or others to a potential for injury
or illness. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1388 (citing Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189 (4th
Cir. 1982)). Again, it follows that the medical institution must know the employee's HIV
status to fulfill that responsibility. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1388.
153. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1388-89 (holding that monitoring of HCW's health status is
permitted "to protect patients and co-workers and to accommodate any current or future
handicap of the employee").
154. 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
155. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991). The court found that the policy of restricting surgical privileges of HCWs who pose
"any risk of HIV transmission to the patient" was a reasonable exercise of the hospital's au-
thority. Id. at 1255.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15 6 Specifically, the court required
the hospital to show that its policy of temporarily suspending and
thereafter restricting a doctor's surgical privileges was substantially
justified by a reasonable probability of harm to the patient.5 7 This
probability of harm, the court explained, arises not only from the
probability of actual transmission, but also from the possibility that
the occurrence of an accident during surgery would require postop-
erative testing for HIV infection.158 The court stressed that testing
in such circumstances is inherently traumatic for the patient and
could potentially cause changes in the patient's lifestyle until his or
her HIV status is ascertained.15 9 Relying on these postulates as
proof of potential harm, the court in Behringer determined that the
policy of restricting the scope of HIV-infected surgeons' practices is
a proper means of preventing transmission of the virus and of pro-
tecting the physical and emotional health of patients..' 0
In summary, the courts in Leckelt and Behringer found that a com-
pelling societal interest takes precedence over the individual Fourth
Amendment rights of HCWs. Society's need to know a health care
worker's HIV status leads to the inevitable topic of mandatory test-
ing. Because these decisions hold that the government's interest in
protecting patients from HCWs infected with HIV is paramount, the
next logical step is that mandatory testing of HCWs is justified in
certain circumstances. 16'
Accordingly, the court in Leckelt applied the "individualized in-
quiry" duty articulated in Arline and found that the requisite condi-
tions existed to require that the HCW turn over the results of his
HIV test to his employer, the hospital, because the hospital had a
right to require HIV testing in order to fulfill its health care obliga-
156. Id. at 1281-82 (using analytical framework of Restatement to justify balancing risk
against utility of HCW performing invasive procedures).
157. See id. at 1255 (finding that response of hospital was not based on arbitrariness or
prejudgment, but resulted from reasoned analysis).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1266.
160. See id2 at 1283 (holding that hospital acted reasonably in restricting plaintiff from
performing invasive procedures as there was "reasonable probability of substantial harm")
(quotingJansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 541 A.2d 682, 688 (NJ. 1988)). Another factor
in the court's analysis was that the risk of transmission involving this surgeon could be com-
pletely prevented by using a different surgeon. Id.; see also supra note 28 (discussing substitu-
tion of surgeons as "viable policy option").
161. But see Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1135 (arguing that mandatory testing is unrea-
sonable and unnecessary). Orentlicher contends that the court's attempt in Behringer to elimi-
nate all risk of transmission from HCW to patient by a policy of mandatory testing and
prohibition of all invasive procedures was unnecessary. Id. Additionally, he contends that
voluntary testing is an adequate response because the moral, ethical, and legal obligations in
the medical community are adequate to control the risk of transmission from HCW to patient.
Id. at 1136-37.
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tions.162 Because an HIV-positive individual is a "handicapped indi-
vidual" as defined in section 504,163 a hospital has a duty to
determine if this HCW is otherwise qualified to do the job, or if it
could provide reasonable accomodations so the HCW can perform
his or her job. t64 Thus, the Leckelt court found that the only logical
way for a hospital to fulfill its duty to accommodate a handicapped
employee is to become informed about the employee's health sta-
tus. 165 Furthermore, it found that protecting patients and co-work-
ers of HIV-infected employees from being exposed to the virus is a
legitimate reason for a health care institution to inquire into a
worker's HIV status. 166 Accordingly, the hospital in Leckelt sus-
pended the plaintiff's employment activities until his HIV test re-
sults became available.
167
As applied in Leckelt, therefore, Arline mandates that the suspected
HCW be tested for the AIDS virus. Once the AIDS test result is
received, the institution is able to evaluate the HCW's condition
and, if the worker is infected, can determine whether the HCW
poses a risk to patients or other employees and whether "reasonable
accommodations" can be made to allow the HCW to work in some
capacity. 168 The subsequent codification of Arline 16 9 resulted in an
administrative policy classifying AIDS as a contagious disease and
therefore as a handicap. 170 The statute seems also to require, at
162. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); seesupra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (describingArline duty
of "individualized inquiry" and discussing appropriate responses).
163. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing relevant definitions contained
in § 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
164. See supra note 138 (noting definition in § 504 that "qualified handicapped person" is
one who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform job requirements).
165. LecAelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1389.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1384-85; see id. at 1388 (observing that in order to begin evaluating and dealing
with situation surrounding suspected infected HCW, knowledge of that HCW's HIV status is
required).
168. See id at 1388 (holding that inquiring into health status of suspected HIV-positive
HCW is not enough because condition of infected HCW, once known, must be monitored as
part of continuing duty under Arline). During congressional debate preceding codification of
the Arline duty, Representative Don Edwards (D.-Cal.) stated that the Arline duty requires "a
medical assessment of whether exclusion is necessitated by the degree of risk involved in the
particular situation.... The outcome of each case will depend on the medical facts concern-
ing the particular infectious condition, how that infection is transmitted, and the nature of the
job in question." 134 CONG. REC. H584 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988), quoted in Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990). Rep-
resentative Edwards further added that this amendment was fashioned "in such a way that the
courts will continue to adjudicate cases involving AIDS, HIV infection and other communica-
ble conditions on a case by case basis." 134 CONG. REC. H584 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (re-
marks of Rep. Don Edwards).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (Supp. I 1990) (codifying Arline).
170. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Attorney General, U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the Presi-
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least in practice, that employees be tested. Employers can act best
when they are informed of all pertinent facts, not when making deci-
sions on the basis of prejudice and apprehension.1 7 1 Section 504,
however, only applies to those institutions that receive federal mon-
ies. 172 Nevertheless, the interpretation of section 504's requirement
of an individualized inquiry may have broad implications even for
those institutions not receiving federal monies. They too may have
a duty to conduct this individualized inquiry.
II. INFORMED CONSENT AND "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" THEORIES
COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF HIV-PoSITIVE STATUS
The CDC guidelines address the issues of patient consent and the
HIV-positive HCW. The guidelines specify whether and under what
conditions an HIV-infected HCW has an affirmative duty to disclose
the fact of his or her infection to patients. In considering these is-
sues, courts have applied theories of medical malpractice and pa-
tient informed consent.
A. HIV-Positive Status as Material Information
The theory of medical malpractice arises from tort principles as
HCWs perform work requiring special skills that demand a mini-
mum of particularized knowledge and ability.175 HCWs therefore
must exercise care that is reasonable given their special skills,
knowledge, and ability.' 74 An HCW's liability for malpractice is
predicated on the satisfaction of two conditions. First, an HCW
must act or fail to act in such a way that his or her behavior is incon-
sistent with the medical profession's standards of practice. 75 Sec-
dent (Sept. 27, 1988) (issuing Reagan administration opinion that HIV infection qualifies as
handicap under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act), cited in Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F.
Supp. 1377, 1386 (E.D. La. 1989), aft'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Gostin, supra
note 28, at 44 n.169 (detailing conceptual evolution of AIDS as "handicap" for purposes of
§ 504).
171. Cf School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (finding that Congress, by enact-
ing § 504, intended to counter adverse affects caused by societal myths and fears regarding
capabilities of handicapped individuals).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
173. See KEETON ETAL.,supra note 18, § 32, at 185 (discussing level of conduct required of
professional persons by law).
174. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 32, at 185 (discussing tort theory of professional
malpractice).
175. See KEETON ETAL.,supra note 18, § 32, at 187 (stating that physician should be judged
according to "tenets of the school [of medicine] the doctor professes or follows" where ex-
perts disagree on minimum standards). Traditionally, allowances were made for differences
in practice procedures between communities. Id. § 32, at 187-88. The ease by which informa-
tion is distributed in today's society, however, has caused courts to reject this concept. Id.
§ 32, at 188. Instead, courts employ a national medical standard, especially in cases where
medical specialties are involved. Id.; see also Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 129 & n.19
508 [Vol. 42:479
1993] HIV TESTING OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS 509
ond, violation of these standards of practice must cause injury to the
patient.1 76 Tort law imposes an affirmative duty on the HCW to in-
form the patient of the risks inherent in any proposed treatment and
even in alternative treatments not being advocated by the HCW. 177
The difficulty arises when attempting to determine whether the in-
formation actually imparted to the patient satisfies the above re-
quirements so that the patient is then capable of giving informed
consent to the treatment.1 78
Resolution of this difficulty is based on whether the information
given, or, as the case may be, the information withheld, was "mate-
rial" to the patient's decision to undergo the treatment. 179 Tradi-
tionally, the medical community was responsible for defining
"material," 180 but a modem trend has supplanted this approach
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that medical specialists are held to national standard and not to
standard of physician in local community); East v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 &
n.9 (D. Md. 1990) (setting duty of care owed by doctor based on national standard); Sewell v.
United States, 629 F. Supp. 448, 455 (W.D. La. 1986) (assessing liability against physician
where standard of care exercised by physician drops beneath national standard).
176. See, e.g., Mann v. United States, 904 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring plaintiff who
alleged that medical malpractice during surgery caused harm to prove that doctor failed to
exercise average skill in performance of surgery); Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 342-
47 (4th Cir. 1982) (requiring plaintiff to prove that physician failed to provide standard of
care where alleged malpractice caused patient to lose lung); Sewell v. United States, 629 F.
Supp. 448, 455 (W.D. La. 1986) (holding that physicians are not held to standard of perfec-
tion but are liable where their actions fall below ordinary standard of care in case where al-
leged misdiagnosis resulted in neurological deficit and paraplegia); see also Boyce v. Brown, 77
P.2d 455, 457-58 (Ariz. 1938) (articulating general factors to be considered in determining
presence of malpractice).
177. See Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 1984) (indicating that patient
needs to know alternative treatments and risks of those treatments before informed consent
can be given); KEETON Er AL., supra note 18, § 32, at 190 (discussing scope of disclosure neces-
sary to enable patient to reach intelligent, informed decision). This duty arises out of the
principle that each person has a right to determine what may be done to his or her body as a
matter of personal autonomy. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 32, at 190; see also Harbeson v.
Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that doctrine of informed consent
"is premised on the fundamental principle that a competent individual has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with [his or] her own body"). Thus, the patient needs to be informed
adequately to make an intelligent decision whether to consent to a particular treatment. Har-
beson, 746 F.2d at 522.
178. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 32, at 190-91; see also Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d
162, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing need for patient to be informed of nature and possi-
ble consequences of operation before informed consent can be given); Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F.
Supp. 776, 780 (W.D. Ark.) (treating patient consent to operation as ineffective where patient
was not informed of dangers of operation), aff'd men., 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976); Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) (holding that doctor may still breach duty to in-
form, even where consent is given, by failing to inform patient of options and risks, assuming
injury occurs).
179. See Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522 (stating that materiality is guide for disclosure); Flan-
nery v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 679 F.2d 960, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(concluding that doctors have duty "to provide specific warnings of material risks"); Lambert
v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 238-39 (10th Cir. 1979) (choosing materiality rather than common
practice of other doctors as guide for disclosure).
180. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 32, at 191 (defining concept of "materiality" as
being grounded in professional medical standard, which is gauged as what reasonable physi-
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with a standard centered on the individual patient. 81 In other
words, the information is deemed material if the patient would con-
sider such information necessary in reaching a decision whether or
not to undergo treatment.1 82 Today courts adopt either a totally
subjective approach, or they adopt an approach based on a reason-
able person in the patient's position.183 A reasonable patient is de-
fined as a prudent person in the patient's position, taking into
account the patient's medical history and any other factors that
could help determine the materiality of risk to that patient.'
8 4
Under either approach, tort principles require the injured patient to
dan would do in same circumstances); see also Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir.
1981) (upholding statute that limits disclosure of material risk to standard established by
medical community); Cohen v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D. Ariz. 1982) (requir-
ing physician to disclose material risks that reasonable physician in same community would
disclose); Pegram, 406 F. Supp. at 779-80 (maintaining that physician must use skill and judg-
ment of average peer in choosing what information qualifies as "material" and therefore must
be disclosed).
Further, several state statutes have framed issues of informed consent in terms of medical
community standards. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1989) (requiring plaintiff to
prove that health care provider did not furnish information that other health care providers
with similar training and in same community would have provided); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-
2816 (1988) (defining scope of informed consent based on information that would be pro-
vided by health care provider in similar practice in community); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-
118 (1992) (requiring plaintiff to prove that health care provider did not furnish information
in accordance with accepted professional standard); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (1990)
(attaching liability where health care provider failed to disclose risks that "reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed").
181. See, e.g., Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989) (using subjective
standard rather than reasonable person standard in determining whether physician gained
patient's informed consent); Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522 (using standard of reasonable person
in patient's position to determine materiality of undisclosed information); Hartke v. McK-
elway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1548 (D.C. Cir.) (using standard of reasonable person in patient's posi-
tion to determine materiality of risk), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); Henderson v. Milobsky,
595 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that patient, not medical community, determines
scope of information needed to achieve informed consent); Scott, 606 P.2d at 557-58 (holding
that standard for disclosure is set by patient's need to know and not by medical community);
see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (noting that "[u]nlimited discretion in the
physician is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed
decision").
182. See Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1984) (maintaining
that patient must show that different course of treatment would have been chosen had mate-
rial risk been disclosed); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 39 (1st Cir.) (requiring patient to
show that surgery would have been declined had she been fully aware of risk), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 852 (1984); Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (requiring
showing that reasonable person in plaintiff's circumstances would have refused to undergo
treatment had risks been fully disclosed).
183. Compare Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979) (holding that risk is
material and therefore must be communicated if it would likely affect patient's decision to go
forward with treatment) with Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.) (attaching
liability where "reasonable patient's" decision to undergo treatment would have been affected
by disclosure of information in question), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
184. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91 (rejecting subjective assessment of materiality and
adopting reasonable patient in similar circumstances standard); see also Hartke v. McKelway,
707 F.2d 1544, 1548-51 (D.C. Cir.) (affirming use of reasonable patient standard and conclud-
ing that patient with history of gynecological problems implicated her physician's duty, and
subsequent failure, to disclose risk of pregnancy), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 98. (1983).
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show a breach of the HCW's duty and then a causal link from the
breach to the injury.185
An HCW's duty to obtain informed consent from patients is im-
posed by the tort system in an attempt to address the risks arising
from prescribed treatments. The question remains, however,
whether the HIV status of the responsible HCW is a material fact
that must be conveyed to the patient as a prerequisite to obtaining
informed consent.' 8 6 The court in Estate of Behringer v. Medical
Center'8 7 settled the issue by concluding that because there was a
risk of transmission that would result in the death of the patient, the
HIV-positive status of the surgeon was material.'8 8 The court did
not focus on the risk of transmission inherent in the particular pro-
cedure, but based its decision on the fact that the possibility of
transmission exists whenever an HIV-positive HCW performs an in-
vasive procedure. 8 9 The court also considered that if an incident
185. See Scott, 606 P.2d at 559 (listing elements plaintiff must prove in action for medical
malpractice). As enunciated in Scott, these elements are:
1) defendant physician failed to inform [the patient] adequately of a material risk
before securing [the patient's] consent to the proposed treatment;
2) if [the patient] had been informed of the risks [the patient] would not have
consented to the treatment;
3) the adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact occur and [the
patient] was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment.
Id. The court concluded that "[a]s a defense, a physician may plead and prove plaintiff knew
of the risks, [or] full disclosure would be detrimental to patient's best interests[,] or that an
emergency existed requiring prompt treatment and patient was in no condition to decide
." Id at 559.
186. See Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989) (discussing general tort
liability for "negligent, fraudulent, or intentional" transmission of communicable disease).
The court in Mussivand concluded that people who are aware that they are infected with a
venereal disease have an affirmative duty to prevent the spread of the disease to those at risk
of being infected. Id; see also Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1953)
(quoting 25 Am. JUR. Health § 45 (1940)) (discussing duty to prevent exposure of another to
tuberculosis). Further, where a person is aware that his or her disease is communicable, fail-
ure to disclose that fact to a potential receiver may be grounds for an action based on negli-
gent, fraudulent, or intentional transmission of the disease. See B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175,
1179-84 (Md. 1988) (finding liability for failure to disclose presence of venereal disease to
sexual partner where partner contracts same disease); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652
(Mo. 1986) (holding that spousal immunity did not bar wife from proceeding against husband
for wrongfully and negligently transmitting herpes to her); Maharam v. Maharam, 510
N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (App. Div. 1986) (allowing wife to maintain action against husband "for
wrongful transmission of genital herpes on theories of either fraud or negligence"). These
holdings imply that negligent transmission of AIDS to a sexual partner may be cognizable
under the common law. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (examining possibility of
liability for sexual transmission of AIDS).
187. 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
188. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991). The court stated that the "risk of accident and its implications thereof would be a
legitimate concern to the surgical patient, warranting disclosure of this risk in the informed-
consent setting." Id.
189. Id. at 1281 (noting that NewJersey cases address both risks inherent in procedures
and "any attendant substantial risks" in determining materiality) (quoting Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504, 506 (NJ. 1988)). The court in Behringer also suggested, as another rationale for
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does occur during surgery, the patient is subjected to HIV testing
for a period of up to one year l9 0 to ascertain whether the HIV virus
was transmitted.19' The court held that where invasive procedures
are performed, a surgeon's HIV-positive status must be disclosed
because it is a material element of informed consent.' 9 2
Commentators, however, are not in agreement with the conclu-
sions drawn by the court in Behringer regarding the necessity of pa-
tient informed consent.' 9 3 Professor Gostin contends that the risk
of transmission is too small to be controlling, and therefore, in-
formed consent is not necessary. 19 4 Gostin offers two reasons for
this conclusion. First, he argues that the theory of informed consent
does not apply to the "highly remote or unforeseen risks" presented
in this situation.19 5 Second, Gostin asserts that requiring informed
consent would invite irrational discrimination against infected
HCWs, potentially ruining the HCWs' professional and personal
lives.196 Instead, Gostin argues that an infected HCW's employer
and the licensing authorities should be informed. 19 7 These groups,
according to Gostin, are better able to monitor the professional
competency of the HCW and to determine whether any risks to pa-
tients are posed. 19 8 Gostin further believes that the infected HCW's
HIV status should only be revealed where there is a sufficiently
"compelling public health benefit" to be attained by releasing the
information, but he contends that disclosure to patients does not
its decision, that there may be a duty to warn third parties requiring HIV-positive surgeons to
disclose their HIV status to patients. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281 n.19.
190. Id. at 1266; see also GUIDE TO DISEASES, supra note 1, at 366 (stating that diagnosis of
AIDS usually occurs between one and three years after exposure).
191. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1280 (basing decision partially on fact that period of waiting
for HIV test results will create great anxiety in patients and may induce changes in lifestyle
and child-bearing decisions even if test results are negative).
192. Id. at 1279-83.
193. See Gostin, supra note 57, at 304 (discussing costs and benefits of disclosing HIV-
positive status of HCWs to patients); Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136 (characterizing ap-
proach of court in Behringer to issue of informed consent as both "unnecessary and
counterproductive").
194. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304.
195. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304 (comparing HCW's failure to disclose HIV-positive sta-
tus with routine practice of not informing patients of other low risk items such as infections or
relative skill of provider).
196. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304-05 (adding that retrospective disclosure ofHCW's HIV
status would create needless anxiety in patient and suggesting that problem be solved by
making HIV testing of patients routine).
197. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304-05 (asserting that limiting scope of informed consent to
benefits and risks of medical procedures is something that employers and licensing authorities
can best evaluate).
198. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304 (asserting that informed consent alone cannot protect
patients in absence of professional and licensing authorities' enforcement of professional
standards).
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meet this standard, and thus is not warranted in this situation. 199
The decision in Behringer has been criticized for its "zero-risk tol-
erance" standard. The American Medical Association (AMA) Office
of the General Counsel contends that this standard is "both unnec-
essary and counterproductive" 200 and that requiring informed con-
sent would likely result in irrational discrimination. 20 Even if
dissemination of an HCW's HIV status were to remain 'within a
small group, the AMA argues, no patient would permit an HIV-posi-
tive HCW to perform any procedure, whether or not the procedure
posed a health risk.20 2 The result, of course, would be an effective
end to any practice by an infected HCW.20 3 If representative of the
medical community at large, the AMA commentaries indicate that a
large gulf exists between the opinion of the medical community and
the courts.
B. "Special Relationship" and the Duty to Control the Conduct of Others
The requirement of informed consent, predicated on both HCWs'
expertise and the need for patient autonomy over health care deci-
sionmaking, mandates that infected HCWs reveal their condi-
tions.20 4 The nature of the doctor-patient relationship dictates that
the patient rely heavily on the ability, honesty, and integrity of the
199. Gostin, supra note 57, at 304 (contending instead that disclosure would create anxi-
ety in patients and foster unjustified discrimination against HIV-positive HCWs). But see In re
Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1295-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding "com-
pelling need" to disclose surgeon's HIV-positive status to patients). The court in In re Hershey
found this "compelling need" to disclose, based on a Pennsylvania statute, by balancing "the
need for disclosure against the privacy interest of the individual and the public interests which
may be harmed by disclosure." Id at 1295 (quoting 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7608(c)
(1992)). The court considered the damage to the physician's professional life, the effect of
requiring disclosure on the price of medical care and malpractice insurance, and the disincen-
tives for HCWs to treat HIV-positive patients. Id. The court found the interest in public
health more compelling than these other factors and therefore required disclosure. Id. at
1296-97. More specifically, this "compelling need" to disclose had to be based on a "con-
crete medical need." Id at 1295 n.6 (stating that need for result of HIV test must be to make
"important medical decision" and cannot be based on simple "desire to know").
200. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136 (suggesting that guidelines for disclosure estab-
lished by "public health officials should guide decision to disclose risk of HIV transmission to
patients").
201. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136 (asserting that patients are reluctant to receive
care from HIV-positive physicians regardless of nature of contact).
202. Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136 (concluding that guidelines set by impartial pub-
lic health officials are preferable to approach taken by court in Behringer, which required dis-
closure to patient).
203. But see Orentlicher, supra note 31, at 1136 (noting that even after disclosure patient
may still choose "unusually qualified" HIV-positive surgeon to perform difficult procedure or
that patient in rural area may still choose HIV-positive physician rather than travel considera-
ble distance to see another physician).
204. See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text (discussing informed consent and duty
to reveal requirements where HCW is seropositive for HIV).
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HCW.205 Patients place themselves, without reciprocation, into the
hands of their doctors. 20 6 Tort law recognizes this "special relation-
ship" in several respects. 20 7 Where the patient's conduct or emo-
tional health poses a risk of harm to foreseeable third parties, the
treating HCW has a duty to take action and attempt to prevent the
harm from materializing by warning those parties put at risk.208
Legal theorists apply this concept of "special relationship" across
a spectrum of societal relationships. 20 9 The case of Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of the University of California210 stands as the benchmark for the
application of this "special relationship" theory.2 1' In Tarasoff, the
defendant, a psychologist named Dr. Lawrence Moore, counseled a
patient who, during therapy, made specific death threats against Ta-
tiana Tarasoff.2 12 Dr. Moore notified neither Tarasoff nor the police
205. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 605 (discussing ethical considerations involved in doctor-
patient relationship); see also Arnold S. Relman, What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, AT-
LANTic MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 100 (describing privileged position of HCWs in society result-
ing from public belief that HCWs will "faithfully discharge [their] fiduciary responsibility"
outlined in ethical codes).
206. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 605 (maintaining that while doctors are responsible for
their own health and their patients', patients are neither responsible for or able to ascertain
their doctor's health).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 315, 319 (1985) (articulating concept that
"special relation" may exist between actor and another which creates duty upon actor to con-
trol other person, especially where that party shows "dangerous propensities"); see also KEE-
TON ET AL., supra note 18, § 56, at 383-85 (suggesting that certain relationships are custodial in
nature, imposing duty to control party exhibiting dangerous propensities toward others);
Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE LJ. 886,
888-98 (1934) (discussing theory that society recognizes certain human relationships as trig-
gering affirmative duty to control another's behavior and thereby prevent unreasonable risk
to third party).
208. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (discussing duty to warn concept as
developed in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)).
209. The duty to control another arises in the following situations, among others: parent
and child, master and servant, schools and students, prison officials and prisons, drivers and
passengers, and hospitals and patients. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 316 (1981)
(commenting that duty arises from special relationship and not from ability to control an-
other's conduct); KEETON Er AL., supra note 18, § 56, at 383 (maintaining that such relation-
ships arise where relationship is protective or custodial in nature); Harper & Kime, supra note
207, at 888-98 (positing that duty arises where another person uses property in owner's pres-
ence, between parent and child, and in extraordinary situations).
210. 551 P.2d 334, 345-46 (Cal. 1976).
211. See generally Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation to Breach
Confidentiality, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 495, 512-17 (1990) (discussing duty of HCWs to
warn foreseeable third parties of risks of AIDS transmission); Michael D. Roth, Dilemma of
Tarasoff: Must Physicians Protect the Public or Their Patients?, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTi CARE 104,
105-10 (1983) (addressing concerns of medical community and advising HCWs to adhere to
law); Dianne S. Salter, The Duty to Warn Third Parties: A Retrospective on Tarasoff, 18 RuTERS
LJ. 145, 146-54 (1986) (examining imposition of duty on mental health care worker to warn
potential victims of patients).
212. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339, 341 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that patient informed Dr. Moore that he intended to kill woman whom he did not name but
who was easily identifiable as Tarasoff, after her return from Brazil).
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of these threats, 213 and soon thereafter, the patient carried through
with his threats.21 4 The California Supreme Court agreed with
Tarasoff's estate, holding that Dr. Moore violated his duty to warn
Tarasoff of the threats against her life.215 This duty, the court held,
is not absolute, but is created where a party "stands in some special
relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be con-
trolled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that con-
duct." 216 This duty to warn is limited, consequently, to harm that is
foreseeable, and it is owed only to easily identifiable parties.217 This
principle could seemingly be extended to HCWs and hospitals
where HIV-infected HCWs practice.2 18
1. Duty of HCWs: controlling themselves and patients
The common law assesses liability against any person who negli-
gently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease.21 9
To show negligence, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant knew of
the disease's presence and of its contagious nature.220 For example,
state courts have consistently held that persons infected with vene-
real disease must notify their sexual partners of their infection.2 2 1
213. Id. at 340-41 (noting that Dr. Moore did notify campus police, who detained patient
briefly, but released him after he promised "to stay away from Tatiana").
214. Id. at 339, 341.
215. IA at 347-48 (stating that "[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins").
216. Id at 342-43 (failing to address question of whether foreseeability, in absence of
special relationship, would create duty to protect another person from harm).
217. Id at 342 (stating that foreseeability is "the most important ...consideration in
establishing duty").
218. Cf id at 343 n.7 (quoting Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 432 P.2d 193, 196 (Cal.
1967), which held that when hospital has knowledge of facts that put patient at risk, or its
patient puts others at risk, hospital must use "reasonable care in the circumstances" to pre-
vent that foreseeable harm); Harper & Kime, supra note 207, at 905 (discussing "elasticity" of
duty to control conduct of another person). Harper and Kime concluded:
The principles governing the duty of one person to control the conduct of another
have this general elasticity which characterizes other principles of tort law. When,
therefore, novel cases involving the problem arise, it will become the duty of the
judges to examine the analogies of such cases as are discussed here and to determine
whether, in the light of human experience as reflected in these decisions, the rela-
tions of the parties fall into one or the other of the general divisions mentioned.
Harper & Kime, supra note 207, at 905. The authors conclude that the duty to control the
conduct of another person arises in two situations: when a person has a special relationship
with the potential victim or with the person whose conduct needs to be controlled. Id. at 904.
In the case of an HIV-infected HCW, it is the provider's relationship with the patient at risk of
contracting AIDS from the HCW that requires the provider to protect the patient.
219. See, e.g., Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989) (holding wife's lover,
who was infected with venereal disease, liable for negligence for failing to warn wife's hus-
band that wife was at risk of contracting disease and passing it to husband).
220. Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 269. But cf. C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441,444 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (indicating that constructive knowledge of presence of AIDS would suffice to show
that defendant was negligent in passing AIDS to sexual partner).
221. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
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Liability has been predicated on the failure to warn foreseeable
third parties of the possibility of venereal disease transmission. 222
The opinion in Tarasoff suggests the next logical step: an HCW
could be held "liable to persons infected by his [or her] patient if
[the HCW] .. .fails to warn members of the patient's family."
223
Under this reasoning, HCWs have a duty to warn the known sexual
partners of HIV-positive patients of the risk of transmission. The
court in Behringer acknowledged this duty and responded by ex-
tending it to require that HIV-infected HCWs must inform patients
of the HCWs' infection.224 This holding suggests that HCWs must
ing that man could be held liable for transmitting venereal disease to women where he knew
he had disease); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1181 (Md. 1988) (holding physician liable for
transmitting genital herpes to nurse where physician was aware of disease's presence);
Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that husband could
be held liable for transmitting genital herpes to his wife where he was aware of his illness); see
also Barbara A. v.John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing cause of action
where man fraudulently told partner he was sterile and ectopic pregnancy resulted from sub-
sequent sexual intercourse).
222. See Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 272 (holding defendant infected with venereal disease
liable for failing to inform sex partner's husband that husband's wife, who was having affair
with defendant, was at risk of contracting venereal disease from defendant and transmitting it
to husband). The court based liability on foreseeability and public policy. Id. at 270-71.
First, the court noted that the defendant was a doctor and should therefore be particularly
aware of the presence of a venereal disease and the high rate of its transmission through
sexual intercourse. Id. at 272. The court also noted that the defendant should have foreseen
that a wife will have intimate relations with her husband. Id. at 270, 272-73. Second, the
court asserted that there is a public interest in protecting the health of citizens, especially
from serious diseases that are easily transmitted. Id. at 270, 271.
It is suggested by implication that negligent AIDS transmission creates similar liabilities.
See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441,442-44 (Minn. Ct. App, 1989) (refusing to find defendant
liable for failing to inform fianc6e of HIV infection where defendant had neither constructive
nor actual notice of his condition). The Minnesota court began its analysis by recognizing
that under state common law a defendant could be found liable for negligent transmission of
dangerous, communicable diseases. Id. at 442-43 (citing R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103,
106-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing liability for transmitting genital herpes) and Skill-
ings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919) (discussing liability for transmitting scarlet
fever)). At the time of the parties' engagement, defendant was unaware of his HIV infection,
although a few months later he began treatment for symptoms now known to be related to
HIV infection. C.A. U., 438 N.W.2d at 442. Upon being definitively diagnosed for AIDS, the
defendant informed his fiancee. Id. Subsequently, she tested positive for the virus. Id. The
defendant and plaintiff maintained a sexual relationship from approximately May 1984 to May
1985. Id. The court found that not until late May 1985 did it become known that AIDS could
be transmitted through heterosexual contact. Id. In addition, it was not possible for an indi-
vidual to obtain an anonymous HIV test until the end ofJuly 1985. Id. (noting that prior to
July 1985, test for AIDS was only used for screening blood in Minnesota). The court con-
cluded, therefore, that because the defendant had no knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of his condition during his sexual relations with the plaintiff, he had no duty to inform his
fianc&e of his condition. Id. at 443-44. Although the court did not impose liability, the impli-
cation arising from the court's analysis is that negligent or fraudulent transmission of the HIV
virus will be treated no differently under the law than other communicable diseases. Cf id. at
442-43 (discussing imposition of liability for negligent transmission of other communicable
diseases).
223. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
224. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1281 n.19 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (finding that physician's duty to warn sexual partner of HIV-positive patient
also requires HIV-positive surgeon to warn patients of risk of transmission).
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act based on their special relationship to patients. For the HIV-pos-
itive HCW, that duty requires that patients be warned.
2. Duty on medical institutions: controlling behavior of HCWs
Arguably, a "special relationship" also exists between HCWs and
their associated hospitals. Where a hospital is aware of "dangerous
propensities" of an employee, it must act to control that employee's
behavior.2 25 Health care institutions therefore must, as the hospital
did in Behringer, restrict the practice of an infected HCW.2 26 In Behr-
inger, the risk of transmission was foreseeable, and the surgeon's pa-
tients were identifiable third parties. 227 Absent practice restrictions
on the performance of invasive procedures by infected HCWs, hos-
pitals must enforce a policy of patient consent to treatment by sero-
positive HCWs.2 28 The "special relationship" between HCWs and
hospitals additionally compels hospitals to inform patients pos-
toperatively if the treating HCW subsequently tests positive for the
AIDS virus. 229 This prospective duty is predicated on hospitals hav-
ing notice of an HCW's infection.23 0 Because hospitals must pro-
vide a safe environment for their employees and patients, 231 failure
to inform and enact practice restrictions could open hospitals to
nonfeasance liability.232
III. REVIEW OF CDC GUIDELINES
A. History and Purpose of Guidelines
The CDC guidelines were issued in July 1991233 amidst efforts
within both the medical community and political arenas to address
225. See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text (discussing liability arising from spe-
cial relationships).
226. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (noting that medical center's decision to bar surgeon
from practicing invasive procedures "represents a reasoned and informed response to the
problem").
227. See id. at 1283. But cf Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding
in Controlling AIDS-Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM.J.L. & MED. 7, 47-50 (1987) (recog-
nizing "special relationship" concept from Tarasof but maintaining HCW's duty to warn in
HIV context is limited to foreseeable sexual partners).
228. But cf supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Gostin's the-
ory that public disclosure of HIV status of HCW would destroy HCW's life, without propor-
tionate benefit to patients or society at large).
229. But see Gostin, supra note 57, at 305 (arguing that postoperative disclosure creates
needless anxiety and that better solution is routine mandatory HIV testing of patients).
230. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 611 (stating that institution has duty to protect patient
where institution is aware that HCW is HIV positive).
231. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text (examining medical institutions' duty
to provide safe work environment for employees and safe healing environment for patients).
232. See Keyes, supra note 20, at 612 (discussing applicability of Tarasoffprinciple to health
care institutions and their patients).
233. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 1-9.
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the issues raised by HIV-positive HCWs. 234 In January 1991, the
American Dental Association (ADA) and the AMA announced their
policies regarding HIV-infected dentists and doctors. 23 5 The ADA
adopted a policy whereby HIV-infected dentists either must notify
their patients of their infection before performing any dental sur-
gery or stop performing such procedures. 236 The AMA's statement
cited an ethical responsibility on the part of infected HCWs not to
perform any procedures that might pose a risk of transmitting the
virus to their patients. 237 In addition, the AMA encouraged all doc-
234. See infra notes 235-49 and accompanying text (discussing positions taken by major
medical associations on issues of informed consent and mandatory testing and legislative ef-
forts to address same problems).
235. The AMA's statement reads as follows:
The health of patients must always be the paramount concern of physicians. Conse-
quently, until the uncertainty about transmission is resolved, the American Medical
Association believes that HIV infected physicians should either abstain from per-
forming invasive procedures which pose an identifiable risk of transmission or dis-
close their seropositive status prior to performing a procedure and proceed only if
there is informed consent. As a corollary, physicians who are at risk of acquiring
HIV infection, and who perform invasive procedures, should determine their HIV
status.
In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1295 n.15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (quoting
AMERICAN MEDICAL Assoc., STATEMENT ON HIV-INFECTED PHYSICIANS (Jan. 17, 1991)); see also
Nancy W. Dickey, Physicians Infected with AIDS, 265 JAMA 2293, 2337-38 (1991) (defending
AMA statement in response to critical letter); Rogers Worthington, New Rulesfor Doctors, Den-
tists with AIDS, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1991, at 17 (reporting that AMA statement went further
than ADA statement by recommending that doctors determine own HIV status).
236. Worthington, supra note 235, at 17. Philip Weintraub, the ADA's spokesperson,
stated that "[u]ntil the uncertainty about transmission is resolved, the ADA believes that HIV
(AIDS virus)-infected dentists should refrain from performing invasive procedures or should
disclose their seropositive (infected) status." Id. at 17; see also Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS-
Infected Doctors and Dentists Are Urged to Warn Patients or Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at A18
(quoting statement of ADA issued Jan. 17, 1991).
237. Altman, supra note 236, at A18 (quoting AMA sources as stating that physicians have
right to continue careers in professions that would pose no risk of transmission to patients
and adding that AMA would help HIV-positive doctors find alternative careers). This sugges-
tion follows earlier guidelines produced by the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
which state:
If the risk of transmission of an infectious disease from a physician to a patient exists,
disclosure of that risk to patients is not enough; patients are entitled to expect that
their physicians will not increase their exposure to the risk of contracting an infec-
tious disease, even minimally .... [I]f a risk does exist, the physician should not
engage in the activity.
Karen H. Rothenberg et al., The AIDS Project: Creating a Public Health Policy-Rights and Obliga-
tions of Health Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REV. 93, 119 (1989) (quoting from Council on Ethical &
Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259JAMA 1360, 1361 (1988)).
This 1988 AMA statement has been construed as the definitive position of the medical com-
munity in its examination of the ethical problems inherent in HIV-infected HCWs' practices.
See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1259 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(stating that AMA report set forth standard that had not previously existed). But cf Barnes et
al., supra note 58, at 315 (stating that other professional and public health organizations have
opposed both screening of HCWs and banning them from areas of practice). This position,
however, has not met with universal approval within the medical community. The AMA posi-
tion, it is argued, seeks to implement a "no identifiable risk" standard that is unobtainable in
practice. Id. For example, most HCWs normally carry with them many infectious conditions;
these conditions are present during medical procedures because they cannot be eliminated
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tors who perform surgery or other invasive procedures to be tested
for the HIV virus.2
3 8
On mandatory testing for HCWs, the major national medical as-
sociations have been equally consistent in their belief that
mandatory testing is unwarranted and unnecessary. In June 1991,
the AMA passed a resolution urging physicians to submit voluntarily
to HIV testing.23 9 The purpose of this resolution was to provide
support for the positions previously taken by the AMA that it is a
doctor's ethical responsibility to ensure that patients are not ex-
posed to unwarranted risks of transmission and that physicians who
perform invasive procedures should know whether they are HIV
positive.240 For similar reasons, the American Nurses Association
(ANA) adopted a resolution in July 1991 calling for voluntary test-
ing and disclosure by nurses.24
1
Concurrent with the debate over these resolutions, Congress ex-
amined several differing proposals addressing the issue.242 In the
House of Representatives, Representative William Dannemeyer (R-
Cal.) introduced a bill to amend Title XXVI of the Public Health
Service Act by calling for mandatory testing of all HCWs who per-
form invasive procedures. 243 Following news of the Bergalis story,
completely. Id. at 314. Carrying this no identifiable risk standard to its logical end, these
authors contend, would mean that no medical care would ever be possible. Id. at 314-15.
Applying this standard to HIV-infected HCWs is inconsistent with permitting HCWs to work
despite having other transferable ailments or physical impairments. Id. at 315.
238. Worthington, supra note 235, at 17.
239. Michael L. Millensen, AMA Votes Down Mandatory AIDS Tests for Doctors, Cm. TmB.,
June 27, 1991, at 1. Also, the AMA convention developed plans to make it easier to test
patients for HIV by reducing the size and complexity of the consent form and even by using
oral consent to administer the test to a patient. Id
240. Millensen, supra note 239, at I (discussing conflicting stances taken by delegates dur-
ing debate and passage of resolution by AMA's House of Delegates).
241. Nurses Reject Aids Test, N.Y. TIMES,July 2, 1991, at C6 (stating that ANA's position was
based on belief that test for HIV status is not reliable and that compulsory, universal testing is
prohibitively expensive).
242. See Don Aucoin, Testing Debate Is Still Raging, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1
(describing Sen. Jesse Helms' proposal to imprison and fine infected HCWs for failure to
notify patients and Rep. William Dannemeyer's provision to force mandatory AIDS testing on
all HCWs).
Additionally, the cost of testing is an issue. An HIV test costs between $20 and $25 and
another $200 if the first test is positive. Millensen, supra note 239, at 1. A company recently
received FDA approval to market a test costing only $5, but the test can only be used at
institutions that already have sophisticated laboratory equipment. Scott Williams, Genetic Sys-
tems May Add 85 Jobs-FDA Approval of AIDS Test Gives Firm Boost, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991,
at D4. It is estimated that the cost of testing all HCWs in New York City would cost approxi-
mately $13 million. Jessie Mangaliman, High-Cost AIDS Test, NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 1991, at 33.
It is estimated that the cost of testing HCWs performing invasive procedures in Maryland
would cost $1.5 million. Wendy Melillo, Protecting Patients from Infection, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1992, at 77 (Health Section).
243. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Representative Dannemeyers' bill was in-
troduced on June 26, 1991. 137 CONG. REC. H5209 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Dannemeyer). This bill, entitled "The Kimberly Bergalis Bill: Protect Patients and
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Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) succeeded in persuading the Senate
to pass an amendment to the bill, once it was introduced into the
Senate, that would have created fines and possible prison sentences
for HCWs who, if aware they are HIV positive, do not notify their
patients before performing invasive procedures. 244 A conference
committee rejected the Senate amendment 2 45 and instead adopted
an amendment proposed by Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), which
had previously passed in the Senate 246 and called for voluntary HIV
testing of HCWs as expressed in the CDC guidelines. 247 Congress
also adopted a provision requiring states to enact the CDC guide-
lines or their equivalent within one year of the bill's signing.
248
Health Providers from Communicable Diseases," calls for mandatory screening of health care
providers by states and allows physicians to test patients for HIV, without consent, if the
physician had reason to believe the patient is HIV positive. See 137 CONG. REc. H2376-78
(daily ed.June 26, 1991). Several co-sponsors joined to support this bill after its introduction.
See 137 CONG. REC. H5342 (daily ed.July 10, 1991) (adding eight sponsors to bill); 137 CONG.
REC. H5515 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (adding four sponsors to bill); 137 CONG. REC. H6799
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991) (adding six sponsors to bill); 137 CONG. REC. 8919 (daily ed. Oct.
31, 1991) (adding two sponsors to bill). The bill is currently pending. Hilts, supra note 1, at
A12. Besides calling for mandatory testing of all HCWs, Representative Danneymeyer's bill
seeks a blanket prohibition against infected HCWs performing invasive procedures and also
would permit HCWs to test patients for the HIV virus without their consent. H.R. 2788, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
244. 137 CONG. REC. S10,363 (daily ed.July 18, 1991). The amendment, entitled "Delib-
erate Transmission of the AIDS Virus," states:
(a) Whoever, being a registered physician, dentist, nurse, or other health care pro-
vider, knowing that he [or she] is infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
intentionally provides medical or dental treatment to another person, without prior
notification to such person of such infection, shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not less than ten years, or both.
137 CONG. REC. S9778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991).
245. 137 CONG. REC. H7385 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991). While discussing the Helms amend-
ment to the bill, Representative David E. Skaggs (D-Colo.) stated the following:
While the conference committee wisely rejected the Senate-passed provision requir-
ing a mandatory jail sentence for any HIV-infected health care worker who does not
inform patients of their [sic] infected status, we were forced by Senate negotiators to
accept this alternative language. Make no mistake about it, the language before us is
a vast improvement over what the Senate passed.
Id. The language referenced by Representative Skaggs that was before the House was con-
tained in an amendment proposed by Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and passed by the Senate
on July 18, 1991. 137 CONG. REc. S10,348-50, 10,356-63 (daily ed. July 18, 1991). This
amendment requires states to adopt guidelines from the CDC that are designed to prevent
HCWs from transmitting HIV to patients. 137 CONG. REc. 10,348-50 (daily ed. July 18,
1991). The House subsequently concurred in this amendment, following the recommenda-
tion of the conference committee. 137 CONG. REC. H7404-05 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991).
246. 137 CONG. REC. S10,348-50, 10,363 (daily ed.July 18, 1991).
247. Congress adopted the following language from the CDC guidelines: " 'These guide-
lines [do] not include specific recommendations on testing HCWs for HIV or HBV infec-
tion[,]" and "'HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures should know their HIV
antibody status.'" 137 CONG. REC. S9978-79 (daily ed. July 15, 1991) (quoting from Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 1, 5).
248. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2). Specifi-
cally, the provision states the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, each State Public Health Official shall,
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States that fail to meet this requirement risk losing Public Health
Service Act funds provided by the Federal Government to the
states.
249
B. Details of Guidelines
The CDC guidelines as released attempt to find a middle ground
between the positions of advocates who call for mandatory testing of
all HCWs and of those who argue that no testing should be re-
quired.250 The guidelines encourage that HCWs performing "at
risk" procedures should undergo HIV testing voluntarily251 and
that medical institutions should define for themselves what proce-
dures to consider "at risk.''252 The guidelines do not mandate prac-
tice restrictions for HIV-positive HCWs, but rather suggest that an
expert medical panel impose restrictions after review of each indi-
vidual case.253 Patient consent for "at risk" procedures is needed if
the practicing HCW is infected,254 but postoperative notification is
again left to the discretion of the medical institution. 255 Much of the
CDC's analysis is based on its reliance on the efficacy of "universal
precautions" (UPs) as the procedures best able to reduce the risks of
not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, certify to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services that guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease
Control, or guidelines which are equivalent to those promulgated by the Centers for
Disease Control concerning recommendations for preventing transmission of the
human immunodeficiency virus and the hepatitis B virus during exposure prone in-
vasive procedures, except for emergency situations when the patient's life or limb is
in danger, have been instituted in the state.
Id. § 633, 105 Stat. at 876 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2).
249. Id. The provision makes the following statement:
Compliance with such guidelines shall be the responsibility of the State Public
Health Official. Said responsibility shall include a process for determining what ap-
propriate disciplinary or other actions shall be taken to ensure compliance. If such
certification is not provided under this section within the one-year period, the state
shall be ineligible to receive assistance under the Public Health Service Act ... until
such certification is provided, except that the Secretary may extend the time period
for a State, upon application of such State, that additional time is required for insti-
tuting said guidelines.
Il § 633, 105 Stat. at 876-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2).
250. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Would Curtail Doctors with AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1991, at Al (stating that guidelines excluded mandatory testing, much to surprise of those
fearing CDC would call for such testing and anger of those advocating it). But see Malcolm
Gladwell, CDC Urges AIDS Testing for All Hospital Patients, WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1991, at A3
(discussing draft report of CDC recommending that all patients be offered and encouraged to
take test for HIV as routine procedure).
251. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5-6 (suggesting that HCWs
who perform procedures that are prone to transmission should know whether they are HIV
positive, though not through mandatory testing).
252. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5.
253. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5.
254. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (requiring patient notifi-
cation for at risk procedures).
255. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 6.
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transmission to acceptable minimums. 256 An analysis of the guide-
lines' provisions follows.
1. Efficacy of universal precautions (UPs)
The CDC's philosophy in advocating UPs is that the best way to
reduce the risk of transmission is to reduce the incidence of expo-
sure.257 UPs include the use of various barrier devices and proce-
dures to prevent contact with blood and certain other bodily fluids
that are considered infectious for HIV, hepatitis-B (HBV), or other
bloodborne pathogens, whether or not the fluids actually contain
these viruses. 258 The devices and procedures include hand washing,
protective barriers, 259 certain handling and disposal techniques for
needles and other sharp instruments, and high-level sterilization of
equipment that comes in contact with blood and other fluids that
could contain pathogens. 260 It is the CDC's belief that proper train-
ing, use, and monitoring of UPs will reduce the chance of transmis-
sion of infectious diseases to an acceptable minimum.2 6 1
256. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 1-2 (stating that precise
application of UPs will help decrease risks of transmission of HIV between HCWs and
patients).
257. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (recommending UPs in
order to reduce risk of transmission and implying that risk of exposure will decrease as result);
see OSHA: Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,023 (1991) (comments
to final rule) (rule to be codifed at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030) [hereinafter OSHA Comments on
Bloodborne Pathogens] (explaining Occupational Health and Safety Administration's (OSHA)
methodology in developing safety regulations for bloodborne pathogens in work environ-
ments based on assessments of methods and rates of transmission). OSHA views bloodborne
pathogens differently from, for example, toxic chemicals, where the risk in the latter case is
associated with cumulative dosages over a period of time. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Patho-
gens, supra, at 64,023. Exposure to HBV or HIV may or may not result in transmission. Id.
Repeated exposure increases the likelihood of transmission, but each instance presents the
same risk, which depends on the "virulence of the pathogen, the size of the delivered dose,
and the route of exposure, among other factors, and not upon any prior exposure." Id.
OSHA has therefore concluded that for bloodborne pathogens, "the best way to reduce the
risk of trasmission [sic] is by reducing the exposure." Id.
258. See OSHA: Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,175-82 (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030) [hereinafter OSHA Rule on Bloodborne Pathogens] (listing
standards of prevention employers must implement, including UPs).
259. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2, 5 (providing exam-
ples of protective barrier measures, including double gloving, eye goggles, gowns, and masks
to cover HCWs' mouths and noses).
260. Recommendationsfor Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2. The recent OSHA final
rule on bloodborne pathogens requires employers, both in the health industry and otherwise,
to develop an appropriate program of UPs and to bear the cost of protecting their employees.
OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,124-39.
261. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2 ("Proper application of
these principles will assist in minimizing the risk of transmission of HIV ... from patient to
HCW, HCW to patient, or patient to patient."). Studies appear to bear out the CDC's posi-
tion, at least to some extent. See Edward S. Wong et al., Are Universal Precautions Effective in
Reducing the Number ofOccupational Exposures Among Health Care Workers?, 265 JAMA 1123, 1126
(1991) (discussing results of UPs efficacy study). The study determined that the use of UPs
lowered the number of occupational exposures that resulted in direct contact with blood and
522
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Despite the CDC's support for UPs and the favorable view the
medical community holds of them,262 there are problems with UPs
that suggest serious deficiencies. First; although the key provision
in UPs is the use of gloves for invasive procedures and for other
procedures involving blood or bodily fluids, 263 there are drawbacks
to a strong dependency on the efficacy of gloves. A recent study
found that most glove tears are the result of an unknown mecha-
nism. 264 For example, a tear may be noticed incidentally during or
at the end of a procedure, after the patient's blood or open body
cavity has already been exposed to the surgeon's skin or blood re-
leased from a percutaneous injury.265 The study advocated the use
of double gloving as an added precaution. 266 Double gloving, how-
ever, has not met with universal approval for certain at-risk
procedures. 267 The use of two gloves, or even of a single glove,
albeit to a lesser degree, reduces tactile ability during surgical pro-
cedures and results in greater numbers of injuries caused by sharp
instruments. 268
thus, by implication, reduced the risk of transmission accordingly. Id. The authors indicated,
however, that the potential for exposure was not reduced, but rather that UPs provided effec-
tive barriers to those exposures. IL The study found that the rate of exposure incidence was
not affected by the implementation of UPs but that the likelihood of avoiding exposures in-
creased threefold with the use of barrier devices. Id
262. See, e.g., Wong et al., supra note 261, at 1123 (discussing study conducted by doctors
in which 277 physicians participated and concluded, based on efficacy of UPs, that UPs were
beneficial to medical community).
263. See Wong et al., supra note 261, at 1126 (concluding that use of gloves is "largest
contributor to the efficacy of UPs"). OSHA's recent ruling on workplace bloodborne patho-
gens strenuously urged the use of gloves in all procedures involving blood or other poten-
tially contagious body fluids and not only in procedures where sharp instruments are being
used. See OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,133 (reporting that
OSHA deems gloves to be "a basic precept of prevention of occupational transmission of
bloodborne pathogens").
264. Wright et al., supra note 44, at 1668-69 (reporting that in 168 of sample of 249 glove
tears (67%) mechanism causing tear could not be ascertained).
265. Wright et al., supra note 44, at 1670 (noting that glove tears caused by unknown
mechanisms are less noticeable and therefore are more likely to result in prolonged exposure
of patient to HCW's blood and vice versa).
266. Wright et al., supra note 44, at 1670 (suggesting that regular use of double gloves
"may significantly reduce the exposure to blood-borne pathogens").
267. See OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,012 (noting that
gloves and other protective devices cannot consistently prevent against wounds arising from
use of sharp instruments, including needles); id. at 64,133-34 (listing arguments made by
HCWs who perform phlebotomies (drawing of blood) that even single gloves should not be
required because they reduce tactile ability and cannot prevent needle sticks); see also Wright
et al., supra note 44, at 1670 (maintaining that injuries caused by sharp instruments are espe-
cially serious and that simple barrier devices cannot always prevent such injuries and accom-
panying potential pathogen exposures).
268. See Wong et al., supra note 261, at 1123 ("The possibility exists that UPs may even
increase certain kinds of exposures; for example, the use of gloves may interfere with tactile
input and increase the number of injuries with sharp instruments during procedures."); see
also Wright et al., supra note 44, at 1669 (noting that although impenetrable gloves would
completely eliminate glove tears and injuries from sharp instruments, those available today
have proved too stiff and thick to use for delicate surgical procedures that cause majority of
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Second, it has been suggested that HCWs often do not adhere to
UPs with consistency, due to the high cost of implementing the pro-
cedures. 269 Estimates of the cost of implementing UPs are not insig-
nificant, averaging $327 million per year for the necessary personal
protection equipment 270 and additional annual sums of $134 mil-
lion for training,271 $107 million for vaccination for HBV and
postexposure follow-up treatment, 272 and $102 million for house-
keeping.273 OSHA's Final Rule on Bloodborne Pathogens, specifi-
cally HBV and HIV, has put the cost burden on hospitals and other
health care institutions to provide protective barriers for their
employees. 274
The CDC is less than clear as to the procedures it considers "at-
risk." The agency separates invasive procedures into two classes,
comprised of invasive procedures generally and "exposure-prone
procedures." 275 Exposure-prone procedures are those invasive pro-
cedures for which, according to the CDC, UPs are ineffective in
preventing transmission from HCW to patient, although UPs may
safeguard other classes of invasive procedures.2 76 Although it has
named the classes of procedures in generalities,2 77 the CDC has re-
served to individual institutions the responsibility for determining
which procedures are exposure prone. 278 This decision has caused
injuries to HCWs). The CDC has as much as admitted this fact. In its recommendations to
HCWs, the CDC agreed that routine use of gloves neither prevents most injuries from sharp
instruments nor eliminates the risk of transmission from HCW to patient. Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 3.
269. See Wong et al., supra note 261, at 1126 (noting that physicians performing emer-
gency procedures used barrier devices and other precautions with much less frequency than
physicians performing non-emergency procedures); see also Gerberding & Schecter, supra note
44, at 1573 (citing studies indicating that despite availability of UPs, only 50% of surgeons
sampled recommended them and only 24%o double gloved as matter of course).
270. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,039.
271. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,039.
272. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,039.
273. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,039.
274. OSHA Rule on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 258, at 64,177 ("The employer shall
ensure that appropriate personal protective equipment in the appropriate sizes is readily ac-
cessible at the worksite or is issued to employees.").
275. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that procedures
considered exposure prone include those in which transmission of HBV from HCW to patient
has occurred, despite use of UPs, and those in which percutaneous injury often occurs).
276. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 4.
277. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 4 (naming certain oral,
cardiothoracic, colorectal, and obstetric/gynecologic procedures as examples of exposure-
prone procedures). General surgery, orthopedic, and trauma services are also considered
exposure prone. Id.
278. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (recommending that
individual medical institutions identify for themselves those procedures to be considered "ex-
posure prone"). The medical community, however, has so far refused to take this step and is
pushing the CDC to come up with a definitive list. See Norman Daniels, HIP-Infected Profession-
als, Patient Rights, and the 'Switching Dilemma', 267 JAMA 1368, 1368 (1992) (noting that be-
cause medical organizations refused to create lists of exposure-prone procedures as requested
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a rift between the CDC and the medical community, resulting in a
less than clear delineation as to what procedures are at risk and who
makes that determination.279
Indeed, the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) agreed in December 1991 to amend the guidelines,
dropping the provision that local health officials develop the list of
at-risk procedures. 280  Subsequently, the CDC and HHS removed
themselves from responsibility for this task as well, instead advising
state and local health officials to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether an infected HCW poses any risk to patients. 28 This re-
sponse has been heavily criticized as "pandering" to election-year
political concerns. 28 2 Despite this inconsistent federal action, Con-
by CDC in November 1991, CDC issued draft revisions of its own guidelines); Bernard Lo &
Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Workers Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus - The Next
Steps, 267JAMA 1100, 1102 (1992) (stating that no professional group agreed to supply list of
exposure-prone procedures); Lawrence K. Altman, Health Units Defy U.S. on AIDS Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al (noting that many medical groups refuse to devise list of high-risk
procedures for infected HCWs); Marlene Cimons, Doctors Flout CDC Curbs on Physicians with
AIDS, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at Al (reporting that numerous medical groups have denied
CDC's request for list of exposure-prone procedures).
279. See Daniels, supra note 278, at 1368 (relating medical community's refusal to draw up
lists of exposure-prone procedures and examining CDC's draft revisions that recommend
risks imposed by infected HCWs be reviewed on case-by-case basis); Altman, supra note 278,
at A19 (stating that many health care experts are very concerned about having many different
interpretations of exposure-prone procedures and chaos that could result); Cimons, supra
note 278, at Al, A26 (describing refusal of medical groups to submit requested lists of expo-
sure-prone procedures to CDC and explaining that refusal is rooted in argument that no "sci-
entific basis" exists to require designating procedures as "at-risk").
280. Marlene Cimons, Plan To Ease Curbs on AIDS-Infected Doctors Is Scrapped, L.A. TIMES,
June 14, 1992, at A13. The CDC also agreed to drop the provision requiring HIV-positive
HCWs to inform their patients of their infection. Id, The Federal Government decided to
rewrite theJuly 1991 guidelines after further study revealed no additional cases of virus trans-
missions to patients from HIV-positive HCWs, other than the Bergalis incident. Id.
281. Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. To Let States Set Rules on AIDS-Infected Health Workers, N.Y.
TiMES, June 16, 1992, at C7 (reporting CDC and HHS's decision to allocate authority to
states). Dr. William L. Roper, head of the CDC, said of this shift of responsibility to the states:
We think we will learn more by letting states do various things on a state-to-state
basis and seeing what we learn over the next few years. We may well come back to
the issue in the future, but we do not plan a new set of guidelines or a single Federal
list of exposure-prone procedures.
Id. Professor Gostin has called this decision untenable, saying that the Federal Government
could be making "a very big mistake. The whole purpose of having the CDC come up with
regulations is to make sure states don't pander to local constituencies and victimize HIV-
positive health-care workers." Laurie Garrett, AIDS 'Rules'for Health Workers KOd; Move Leaves
Policing to States, NEwsDAY, June 16, 1992, at 4, 28. Other commentators pointed out that the
states had a relatively short period of time, until only October 1, 1992, to develop these lists,
compared to the CDC, which failed to accomplish the task in more than two years of study and
hearings. Id. Dr. Neil Schram, head of the AIDS Task Force for the American Physicians for
Human Rights, said the situation will force states to create "atrocious guidelines," resulting in
absolute chaos between the states. Id; see also Cimons, supra note 280, at A13 (quoting Dr.
Schram as predicting havoc among states over creation of guidelines).
282. See Cimons, supra note 280, atA13 (noting that detractors of CDC guidelines charged
that CDC's action was politically motivated); Garrett, supra note 281, at 4 (reporting that elec-
tion year politics have led CDC and HHS to avoid taking clear position in guidelines). Critics
suggest that states will also bow to political pressure in responding to the HHS recommenda-
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gress' requirement that states develop guidelines by the end of Oc-
tober 1992 or risk losing federal health care funding remains in
effect.2
83
2. Comparing HIV to HBV
The CDC's recommendations stress the use of UPs for prevention
of HIV transmission by drawing on the experience of health care
officials dealing with hepatitis-B virus. 284 The transmission of HBV
to patients from HCWs, and vice versa, is a comparatively common
occurrence. 285 Since the early 1970s, when serologic testing for
HBV infection was introduced, there have been reports of over 300
patients infected with HBV through treatment by an HBV-infected
HCW.286 Most of these reported transmissions occurred before
health care officials were aware of the risk presented by bloodborne
pathogens, as well as before the use of UPs was stressed.287 All the
same, there is evidence that some instances of transmission still oc-
curred after HCWs began wearing gloves. 288 Because the AIDS vi-
rus has been found to be transmitted similarly to HBV, although at
rates twelve to sixty times slower,289 the CDC applies the same theo-
ries of prevention for both HIV and HBV. There is a fundamental
difference, however, between HBV and HIV. Unlike HIV, both im-
tions. Garrett, supra note 281, at 28 (quoting Gostin as saying that purpose of CDC guidelines
is to prevent states from catering to local constituencies).
283. See Melillo, supra note 242, at 7 (noting that "[flailure to develop policies by Oct. 28
could mean the loss of as much as $2 billion nationally in Public Health Service Funds, which
include grants for treatment of alcohol and drug abuse and mental illnesses as well as money
to help prevent the spread of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)").
284. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2-3 (discussing back-
ground of infection control practices and 20-year history of published reports of HBV
transmission).
285. See OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,009 (referring to
CDC estimates that there are approximately 8700 HBV infections of HCWs per year attrib-
uted to occupational exposure, causing 2100 cases of acute hepatitis with roughly 200 deaths
of HCWs annually). The risk that an HCW will become infected through percutaneous expo-
sure to HBV-positive blood is approximately 30%. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission,
supra note 9, at 3.
286. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2.
287. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 3.
288. See OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,012 ("Some HOWs
continued to transmit HBV to patients in spite of the use of gloves and additional precau-
tions."); Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2-3 (noting that in 8 of 20
reported "clusters," or multiple transmissions associated with single sources of HBV trans-
mission by HCWs to patients, transmission occurred despite glove use by HCWs). There
have been 20 reported clusters of HBV transmission from HCWs to patient. OSHA Comments
on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,012. A few clusters occurred where the HCWs,
obstetricians/gynecologists and cardiovascular surgeons, were wearing gloves at the sus-
pected time of transmission. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 3.
289. Jerome A. Boscia, Surgery, AIDS, and Hepatitis B, 266JAMA 1360, 1:361 (1991) (citing
public health study that found "the risk of infection to a health care worker fbllowing a needle
stick from a carrier of the hepatitis B virus is between 6% and 30%, or 12 to 60 times greater
than the risk following a needle stick from a patient infected with HIV").
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munization and vaccination exist for the hepatitis-B virus.290
The current vaccine for HBV was licensed in 1986291 and has
been found to be 85%o to 97% effective. 292 In addition, pre-contrac-
tion immunization is equally effectual. 293 As a result, the number of
reported HBV cases between 1982 and 1988 dropped by 75%o.294
Both OSHA and the CDC recommend that any HCW who has been
exposed to a patient's blood receive the HBV vaccine if they have
not already been immunized. 295 Immunization or vaccination com-
bined with the use of UPs has proved successful in minimizing the
risk of HBV transmission. 296 It follows that the same preventive
procedures would be equally effective in battling HIV transmission.
But there is no vaccine for HIV, and the virus amounts to a certain
death sentence for infected persons.
Currently, the CDC guidelines permit HBV-infected HCWs to
perform invasive procedures. 297 Typically, employment restrictions
are not imposed until the HCW infects a patient.298 When a trans-
mission occurs, health officials are advised to review infection-con-
trol procedures in place during the time of the transmission and to
make changes, including educating or restricting the HCW's prac-
tice, or both, to guard against future incidents. 299 One author sug-
290. Id. at 1360-61 (discussing effectiveness of HBV vaccine and immunization).
291. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Com-
mittee Update on Hepatitis B Prevention, 36 MORBIDrTY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 353, 355 (1987)
(discussing formulation of new HBV vaccine called Recombivax H, which was licensed by U.S.
Food and Drug Administration in July 1986). An earlier vaccine manufactured from human
plasma has been available in the United States since 1982. Id. at 353. The new vaccine is
created when "a plasmid containing the gene for the hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg)
subtype a & w" is inserted into common baker's yeast and then is harvested, purified, and
filtered. Id. at 355.
292. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,012.
293. See Boscia, supra note 289, at 1360-61 (noting that immunization is one of most im-
portant weapons used to combat HBV).
294. Boscia, supra note 289, at 1361. In addition, since the introduction of these vaccines,
OSHA estimates that 2,568,974 persons (2,029,189 HCWs) have been vaccinated for HBV in
the United States. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,012.
295. OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,013; Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 2 (recommending that hepatitis-B vaccine be given
during period ofprofessional training and before any foreseeable exposures can occur). Prac-
titioners also make this same recommendation. See Boscia, supra note 289, at 1361 (recom-
mending immunization of those HCWs who may be exposed to HBV).
296. See OSHA Comments on Bloodborne Pathogens, supra note 257, at 64,058 (noting that 87%
of occupationally induced HBV exposure could be avoided by combination of vaccination,
engineering controls, work practices, protective clothing, housekeeping, and training).
297. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 319, 328 nn.98 & 103 (discussing CDC guidelines
and citing Walter W. Williams, Guideline for Infection Control in Hospital Personnel, 4 INFECTION
CONTROL 326, 332 (1983) (recommending precautions but not practice restrictions)).
298. Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 320 ("Employment restrictions on workers with
chronic HBV infection have not been routinely imposed unless and until the worker has in-
fected a patient.").
299. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 320 (discussing process following transmission of
HBV from HCW to patient, including: modification of infection control strategy, temporary
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gests that this experience with HBV should be applied in situations
involving HIV-infected HCWs. 300 This proposition, however, is
misplaced. While it is true that HIV is more difficult to transmit
than HBV,30 ' both an inoculation and a vaccine exist for treatment
or prevention of HBV, whereas neither option yet exists for HIV.
3. Voluntary testing of HCWs recommended
The CDC's guidelines do not recommend mandatory testing of
HGWs to determine either their HBV or HIV status. 302 The guide-
lines do state, however, that HCWs who perform exposure-prone
procedures should know their HIV and HBV status. 303 In other
words, it is left to the individual HCW to decide whether to be
tested for the viruses.304 This discretion conflicts with the prospec-
tive duty courts have assigned to hospitals and other institutions to
provide a safe environment for their employees and patients, 305
and, under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, conflicts with the
requirement to test for infectious viruses in order to conduct the
necessary inquiry into the health and safety risks posed by HCWs. 30°
To carry out this duty, medical institutions must have a right to in-
vestigate the health status of their employees. 30 7 In addition, tort
principles place a similar duty on parties to reduce or eliminate if
withdrawal of HCW from practice, re-education of HCW, and change of HOW's practice
techniques).
300. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 320 (inquiring rhetorically why HIV-infected
HOWs should be treated differently than HCWs carrying HBV). Barnes implies that the two
diseases are sufficiently similar to warrant applying HBV infection-control procedures to HIV,
as opposed to establishing guidelines that call for a "case-by-case" review of HCWs or prac-
tice restrictions. Id.
301. See Barnes et aL., supra note 58, at 320 (noting that HBV is much more infectious and
easily transmitted than HIV).
302. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 6 ("Mandatory testing
of HCWs for HIV antibody or [HBV antibody] is not recommended. The current assessment
of the risk that infected HCWs will transmit HIV or HBV to patients during exposure-prone
procedures does not support the diversion of resources that would be required to implement
mandatory testing programs.").
303. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 ("HCWs who perform
exposure-prone procedures should know their HIV antibody status. HCWs who perform ex-
posure-prone procedures and who do not have serologic evidence of immunity to HBV from
vaccination or from previous infection should know their HBsAg [hepatitis-B surface antigen,
which is early indicator of hepatitis-B viral infection] status and, if that is positive, should also
know their HBeAg [hepatitis-B e antigen, whose presence is associated with higher levels of
hepatitis in blood] status.").
304. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5-6 (recommending that
HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures should be aware of their HIV status by un-
dergoing voluntary testing).
305. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text (outlining duty of medical institutions
to provide safe environment for patients and employees).
306. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text (discussing required inquiry under
§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
307. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (outlining duty to conduct "individual-
ized inquiry" under Arline).
HIV TESTING OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS
possible the risk of infection where the danger is great and there is a
rational means to do so.3 0 8 Therefore, a program imposing
mandatory testing of HCWs where suspicion of infection and risk of
transmission exists is justifiable.30 9 By leaving the decision whether
to test individual HCWs, the CDC's guidelines fail to meet the obli-
gations of health care institutions as enunciated by the courts.
310
4. Infected HCW and subsequent practice restrictions
The next step after an HCW has been diagnosed with the AIDS
virus is to determine what, if any, restrictions should be placed on
the practice of that HCW. This determination is particularly impor-
tant if the professional performs invasive procedures. The CDC has
provided less than a definitive answer to this question, however.
According to the CDC, those HCWs who are either HBV or HIV
infected should not continue to perform exposure-prone proce-
dures until they have received guidance from an "expert review
panel."31 ' This panel should determine on a case-by-case basis
those circumstances, if any, under which the infected HCW may
continue to perform at-risk procedures. 31 2 This requirement paral-
lels the "individualized inquiry" required by section 504 and articu-
lated in School Board v. Arline.31 3 If the review panel modifies the
HCW's practice as a result of his or her infection, then whenever
possible, the panel should also provide the HCW with "opportuni-
ties to continue appropriate patient-care activities," 31 4 which may
308. See Estate ofBehringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1281-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991) (reviewing tort theories of risk and practical solutions); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 293 (1981) (describing tort theories of risk analysis); supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text (discussing tort duties in high-risk situations).
309. Cf supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text (discussing Leckelt v. Board of Commis-
sioners requirement of mandatory testing when certain conditions are present).
310. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Leckelt that hospitals
have duty to test HCWs for HIV); see also supra notes 155, 160 (stating opinion in Behringer that
found medical center's policies on testing and restricting HIV-infected HCWs were justified).
311. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5. The panel may include,
inter alia, "a) the HCW's personal physician(s), b) an infectious disease specialist with exper-
tise in the epidemiology of HIV and HBV transmission, c) a health professional with expertise
in the procedures performed by the HCW, and d) state or local public health official(s)." Id.
312. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 ("HCWs who are in-
fected with HIV or HBV ... should not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they have
sought counsel from an expert review panel and been advised under what circumstances, if
any, they may continue to perform these procedures.").
313. 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (holding that individualized inquiry is required under
§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act to effectively protect handicapped individuals while giving concur-
rent consideration to health and safety of others); see supra notes 138, 144-47 (describing
provisions of § 504 and Arline's interpretation of them).
314. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 6. For HBV infection, an
HCW's practice may be modified as needed but should also be completely reinstated when re-
evaluation determines that the HCW's status has changed due to successful treatment of the
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include exposure-prone procedures.31 5
The CDC's position is predicated on the belief that UPs, when
appropriately employed, will minimize the risk of transmission. 31 6
As has been explained, UPs do reduce the risk of transmission, but
they do not eliminate it.317 The CDC itself recognizes that certain
procedures are by nature "at-risk," despite the use of UPs.318 The
CDC should mandate that once an HCW is found to be infected
with the AIDS virus, all invasive procedures, whether "exposure
prone" or not, must completely stop. The acceptable minimization
of risk is the elimination of the risk.319 As a result of the availability
of a vaccine, the use of an "expert review panel" makes sense where
the HCW is infected with HBV. With HIV, however, the panel's use
is a dangerous denial.
5. Requirements of patient consent and notification
The CDC has taken a solid stand with respect to informed con-
sent; the guidelines unequivocally call for patient consent before
either an HBV- or HIV-positive HCW performs any exposure-prone
procedures.3 20 This provision satisfies the duties created by the
courts. 32' When the expert review panel determines the circum-
stances under which the infected HCW may work, one fundamental
prerequisite must be notification of prospective patients of the HBV
or HIV status of their physician before any at-risk procedures are
performed.3 22 The CDC has acknowledged that patient awareness
infection. Id. The CDC also recommends that career counseling and job retraining be made
available to all HBV- and HIV-infected HCWs. Id.
315. Cf Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (implying that expert
panel has discretion to allow infected HCWs to continue to perform exposure-prone
procedures).
316. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that infected
HCWs who follow precautions pose small risk of transmitting HBV and smaller risk of trans-
mitting HIV). On this point, the CDC's recommendations include: (1) all HCWs should fol-
low universal precautions, and (2) those HCWs who have skin conditions ("exudative lesions
or weeping dermatitis") that may pose a risk of transmission should refrain from all direct
patient care and from handling patient-care equipment that is used in performing invasive
procedures. Id.
317. See supra notes 257-74 and accompanying text (discussing arguments relating to effi-
cacy of UPs).
318. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 4 ("Performance of ex-
posure-prone procedures presents a recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW,
and-if such an injury occurs-the HCW's blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity,
subcutaneous tissues, and/or mucous membranes.").
319. See supra notes 31-32, 55-62 (discussing debate on issue of acceptable level of risk).
320. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5. Ifan HIV-positive HCW
were to be restricted from performing these procedures, the issue of informed consent could
obviously be avoided.
321. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text (analyzing theory of informed consent
where practicing HCW is HIV positive).
322. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5.
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about his or her HCW's health status is material information inte-
gral to the giving of consent.3 23
The CDC, however, has been less clear when addressing postop-
erative notification of a patient when an infected HCW has per-
formed an exposure-prone procedure. According to the guidelines,
patient notification should only be considered after balancing an as-
sessment of the "specific risks" and "confidentiality issues" with
"available resources. ' 324 Implicitly then, the CDC leaves this deci-
sion to the discretion of the involved HCWs and the health care in-
stitution. This result is inconsistent with judicial interpretation of
patient consent requirements.3 25 A patient must receive informa-
tion that is "material" to making a decision before undergoing a
particular procedure.326 The risk attendant to a seropositive HCW
performing an invasive procedure qualifies as material informa-
tion.32 7 Surgical injuries are quite common, especially during the
invasive procedures where the virus is most easily transmitted.3 28
Doctors must give patients the opportunity to decide whether they
want to be tested for the virus. The CDC's policy takes that decision
out of the patient's hands and places it in the hands of the HCW.
Given the certain outcome once HIV is contracted, this policy is
unacceptable.
6. Questions left unanswered by guidelines
The CDC's guidelines leave decisions regarding HIV-positive
HCWs, on the issues of voluntary testing, discretionary restrictions
on practice, and postoperative notification, with individual HCWs
and health care institutions.329 Only one policy, informing patients
of their physician's seropositive status where known before perform-
ing at-risk procedures, satisfies the requirements as outlined by the
323. Cf Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (highlighting impor-
tance of patient notification of HGW's infection before exposure-prone procedures are
performed).
324. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that "[t]he public
health benefit of notification of patients who have had exposure-prone procedures performed
by HCWs infected with HIV... should be considered on a case-by-case basis," with careful
consideration of related factors).
325. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text (describing medical and legal empha-
sis on patient-centered approach to medicine).
326. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (noting different interpretations of
"material" information as related to patient's decision).
327. Cf supra notes 179-83, 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing "material informa-
tion" concept of informed consent).
328. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text (outlining studies that indicate that per-
cutaneous injuries are common during surgery).
329. See supra notes 304, 315, 324 and accompanying text (detailing CDC guidelines on
issues of voluntary testing, restrictions on practice, and postoperative notification,
respectively).
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court in Behringer.330 Moreover, the CDC's position ignores and
possibly encourages HCW conflict of interest.
Most hospitals and HCWs believe that their approach to medicine
is patient centered. 331 The law attempts to reflect this philoso-
phy.332 The court in Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center333 expressly
addressed HCW conflict of interest problems surrounding HIV.
33 4
The CDC gives broad, perhaps overly broad, discretion to the medi-
cal community. 335 Decisions to restrict an HCW's practice could
threaten his or her career or livelihood, 336 so expecting HCWs to
make these decisions with objectivity is naive.
In Behringer, the court upheld the hospital's imposition of practice
restrictions but found the hospital liable because it failed to protect
the infected HCW's ability to practice by negligently revealing his
condition.337 The court, however, found that career concerns can-
not come before patient protection.33 8 Courts must guard against
this potential conflict and thus in Behringer the court stood by New
Jersey's strong commitment to the concept of a fully informed pa-
tient.33 9 The plaintiff in Behringer argued that requiring the hospital
to inform the patient regarding the surgeon's positive HIV status
would result in a complete destruction of his surgical practice.
3 40
The court recognized this concern,34 1 but nevertheless acted to
eliminate the "self-interest or self-protection"3 42 pressures that
could inhibit an HCW's ability to make a sound judgment about
330. See supra note 188 (discussing holding in Behringer that HCW's HIV-positive status
must be disclosed before at-risk procedures are performed because it is material element of
informed consent).
331. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991) (discussing that NewJersey courts and medical practitioners adhere to concept of
"fully informed" patient).
332. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (discussing court's attempt in Behringer
to eliminate all risk of transmission where HCW performs invasive procedures).
333. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
334. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1278 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991) (discussing HIV-infected HCW's possible difficulties in making business decisions
regarding his or her practice and medical judgments regarding his or her patients).
335. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text (discussing provision of CDC guide-
lines granting review power to expert panel and examining broad scope of discretion exer-
cised by this group).
336. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1277-78 (discussing difficulties in decisionmaking exper-
ienced by medical centers and HCWs faced with HIV infection).
337. Id. at 1273-74 (predicating liability on medical center's breach of duty and obligation
to keep infected HCW's records confidential).
338. Id. at 1283.
339. Id. at 1280.
340. Id. ("Plaintiff argues that the use of the informed consent form is tantamount to a de
facto termination of surgical privileges."). Plaintiff also raised confidentiality concerns, upon
which the hospital was held liable. Id. at 1273-74.
341. Id. at 1274.
342. Id. at 1277-78 (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976)).
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whether to release the information about his or her HIV infec-
tion.3 43 Because the risk of transmission could not be eliminated,
the HCW was required to inform the patient before performing any
at-risk procedures. 344
The CDC guidelines invite similar risks, as too much discretion is
given to individual HCWs and their institutions. This discretion im-
properly puts patients at risk by subordinating their interests to
those of the individual HCW. Voluntary testing, open-ended prac-
tice restrictions, and lack of patient notification serve the private in-
terests of the medical community, not their patients. As the national
institution that guides medical policy, the CDC must work to main-
tain the patient-centered philosophy that ethics and the law require.
These guidelines fail to do so.
7. State responses
The ambiguity of the CDC guidelines is manifest in state re-
sponses to the congressional mandate that states enact either the
CDC or similar guidelines. For example, many states have passed
legislation calling for mandatory HIV testing of all HCWs.3 45 Given
constitutional concerns, it is questionable whether these laws will
withstand judicial scrutiny.3 46 In addition, a number of states have
343. l at 1278 (mandating use of informed consent doctrine to provide patient control
over his or her risk of being exposed to infectious diseases, which is lacking when only HCWs
are deciding whether to release information regarding their health).
344. Il at 1283.
345. See generally Del. H.B. 191, 136th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1992) (proposing AIDS
and HIV testing of HCWs by state every six months); Fla. H.B. 111, Reg. Sess. (1992) (estab-
lishing program requiring periodic testing of HCWs); Fla. S.B. 122, Reg. Sess. (1992) (requir-
ing testing of HCWs in specific circumstances); La. H.B. 1164, Reg. Sess. (1992) (mandating
testing for health care providers); Md. S.B. 18, 398th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992) (requiring HIV
testing of HCWs under certain circumstances); Md. H.B. 644, 398th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992)
(calling for periodic HIV testing of HCWs); Mich. H.B. 5062, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992)
(requiring periodic AIDS testing of HCWs); N.H. H.B. 1404, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (requiring
HCWs and patients to be tested for infectious diseases); N.H. S.B. 312, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(mandating that HCWs and patients be tested for HIV infection); NJ. S.B. 3588, 204th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (1991) (mandating that hospital HCWs submit to HIV testing); S.C. H.B. 4151,
Statewide Sess. (1992) (mandating that HCWs undergo HIV test at time of application for
licensure, registration, or reapplication); Tenn. S.B. 810, 97th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
(1992) (requiring HIV testing of HCWs in certain cases); Tenn. H.B. 945, 97th Gen. Assem-
bly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992) (proposing HIV testing for HCWs).
346. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, A Call for Mandatory HIV Testing and Restriction of Certain
Health Care Professionals, 94 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 421,431 (1990) (arguing for government
mandated HIV testing for HCWs who engage in invasive procedures, although admitting that
it is unclear whether such testing would be constitutional); Donald J. McNeil & Laurie A.
Spieler, Mandatory Testing of Hospital Employees Exposed to the AIDS Virus: Need To Know or Unwar-
ranted Invasion of Privacy?, 21 Loy. U. CHt. LJ. 1039, 1065-66 (1990) (citing cases as examples
that state constitution may impose great restrictions on HIV testing of HCWs); Patricia S.
Atkins, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory AIDS Testing in the Health Care In-
dustry, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 787, 799 (1988) (noting that state laws calling for mandatory AIDS
tests by private employers would be subject to constitutional scrutiny and courts could find
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enacted the CDC guidelines without modification,3 47 and thus,
which procedures are to be regulated remains an open question. 48
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A TESTING PLAN
A. CDC Guidelines Fail to Anticipate Liabilities
By requiring that states enact the CDC guidelines or similar ones,
such laws unconstitutional on their face or because of their purpose and effect); William A.
DeLoach III, Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing - A Fourth Amendment Analysis: Glover v. Eastern
Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 693, 709-15 (1990) (stat-
ing that holding in Glover that mandatory AIDS testing was invalid resulted from balancing of
government's and employees' interests and that these interests were not compelling enough
to uphold mandatory testing after judicial scrutiny); see also supra notes 72-99 and accompany-
ing text (discussing judicial use of administrative search theories in warranting limited HIV
testing where "compelling governmental need" exists after balancing of competing interests).
347. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250.11 (West 1992) (requiring California
Department of Health to develop guidelines to minimize transmissions of bloodborne infec-
tious diseases and, in doing so, consider CDC's recommendations, existing state regulations,
and input from associations that represent HCWs); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2221.1 (West
1992) (protecting Californians from infected HCWs by allowing Medical Board of California
to take disciplinary action against HCWs who do not follow UPs as recommended by CDC
guidelines); Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.694 (1992) (following CDC guidelines on adherence to
UPs, expert review panel, practice restrictions, patient consent, and voluntary HCW testing);
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 85.201-206 (West 1992) (reviewing findings of CDC;
defining relevant terms; requiring HCWs to adhere to UPs, to refrain from performing expo-
sure-prone procedures unless given permission from expert review panel and, then, to obtain
patient consent; imposing disciplinary action on failures to comply; and explicitly rejecting
mandatory testing of HCWs); Ariz. H.B. 2024, 406th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992) (assigning re-
sponsibility to director of Arizona Department of Health Services to create standards that
conform with CDC guidelines); Ill. H.B. 3048, 87th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991-1992)
(requiring HCWs who have HIV to inform patients of that fact prior to invasive procedures
and also requiring patients who know that they are HIV positive to inform HCWs before
receiving services); Md. H.B. 388, 398th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess., 1992 Md. Laws 154 (to be
codified at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319(h)) (requiring hospitals and other health
care facilities to comply with CDC's guidelines on UPs); Mich. H.B. 5291, 86th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1992) (adopting UPs and regulating practices and activities of HIV-positive HCWs);
N.H. S.B. 410, 152d Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1991-1992) (requiring HCWs to follow UPs estab-
lished by federal and state government); N.Y. S.B. 4732, 214th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg, Sess.
(1992) (following guidelines in creating duty in HCWs to disclose positive HIV status prior to
performing invasive procedures); Ohio H.B. 419, 119th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991-
1992) (mandating that HIV-positive HCWs inform health care facility employer and certain
patients of infection).
A number of state legislatures have introduced legislation that is stricter than that called for
by the CDC guidelines. Del. H.B. 191, 136th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991-1992) (requir-
ing testing of HCWs every six months and following guidelines with respect to practice re-
strictions and informed consent); Fla. H.B. 111, Reg. Sess. (1992) (specifying periodic testing
of HCWs and calling for publication of lists of invasive procedures); Fla. S.B. 122, Reg. Sess.
(1992) (requiring testing for HIV as applied to physicians, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurses,
optometrists, dentists, and midwives); La. H.B. 1164, Reg. Sess. (1992) (mandating HIV test-
ing of all HCWs).
Other states have considered similar bills but have rejected or withdrawn them. See N.H.
S.B. 312, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991-1992) (failing to pass Senate); S.C. H.B. 4151, State-
wide Sess. (1992) (withdrawn from committee in which it was introduced).
348. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement between
state and federal health care groups over responsibility of developing list of at-risk
procedures).
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Congress created a national regulatory standard.3 49 As a result, the
CDC guidelines now supersede the common law. The guidelines
fail, however, to account for standard of care requirements that
courts have enforced. This discrepancy will open HCWs and their
affiliated hospitals to liabilities that would otherwise be contained.
The courts have created four sets of duties for HCWs and hospi-
tals faced with an HIV-infected HCW. First, a hospital has an af-
firmative duty to provide a safe and healthy environment for its
employees and its patients.35 0 When an HCW who performs at-risk
procedures is suspected of carrying the virus, the hospital has an
obligation to have the HCW tested as required by section 504's "in-
dividualized inquiry. 351 Second, when an HCW is found to be HIV
positive, practice restrictions must be imposed forbidding the in-
fected HCW from performing additional at-risk procedures.35 2
Third, if an infected HCW is to perform an at-risk procedure, the
fact that the HCW is infected is material and thus requires disclo-
sure to the patient.353 Fourth, the common law places an affirmative
duty on hospitals and infected HCWs as parties in a "special rela-
tionship" to warn identifiable third parties of potential harm from
their patients.3 54 Under the common law, in sum, HCWs and hospi-
tals know precisely what action is required to minimize risk on a
proactive basis.
The CDC guidelines, on the other hand, delegate key decisions to
discretionary interpretation, thereby leaving both HCWs and hospi-
tals open to unnecessary liabilities. First, the CDC recommends that
HCWs undergo testing on a voluntary basis.3 55 Second, the guide-
lines permit an infected HCW to continue to perform at-risk proce-
dures if sanctioned by an expert medical panel.3 56 Fundamentally,
349. Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. to Let States Set Rules on AIDS-Infected Health Workers, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at C7. Traditionally, CDC guidelines serve as nonbinding recommen-
dations that states may or may not follow. Marlene Cimons, Plan to Ease Curbs on AIDS-Infected
Doctors Is Scrapped, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at A13.
350. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (discussing Estate ofBehringer v. Medical
Center and Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners and those cases' treatment of hospital's duty to fur-
nish safe environment for employees and patients).
351. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text (examining Behringer and Leckelt's
mandatory testing and individualized inquiry standards).
352. See supra notes 151, 157 and accompanying text (repeating courts' holdings that hos-
pitals have duty to restrict HIV-positive HCWs from performing certain procedures).
353. See supra notes 188-89 (noting Behringer court's conclusion that HCWs' health status
must be disclosed as material element of informed consent).
354. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (outlining tort concept of "special relation-
ship" and duties arising from it).
355. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5.
356. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that expert
review panel should advise infected HCWs under what circumstances, if any, they may con-
tinue to perform exposure-prone procedures).
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the guidelines fail to provide hospitals and HCWs with the mecha-
nisms needed to acquire knowledge about potential infection and
transmission risks.a57 The CDC guidelines do not reflect the affirm-
ative duty on hospitals to provide a safe environment for employees
and patients because they fail to acknowledge the individualized in-
quiry requirements of section 504.358 Moreover, once knowledge of
HCW infection is acquired, there are no provisions in the guidelines
to instruct hospitals and HCWs as to the next step of action. For
example, failure to act to prevent foreseeable harm opens hospitals
and HCWs to personal injury liability to plaintiffs who could be
either patients of suspected HIV-positive HCWs or identifiable third
parties put at risk by infected HCWs. Already, doctors are advertis-
ing to the public that they are HIV negative.359 Therefore, to pro-
tect both the medical community and patients, guidelines more
closely aligned with the common law need to be enacted.
B. Elements of a Workable Testing Plan
The common law interpretations enunciated in Leckelt v. Board of
Commissioners360 and Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center3 6' best articu-
late the actions appropriate to the HIV-infected HCW. The court in
Behringer, for example, based its holding on the analysis provided by
section 293 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and noted that the in-
terests being threatened, patient health and the rights of HCWs, are
given great deference in our society. 362 Therefore, the acceptable
magnitude of risk must be justifiably small, or, if possible, elimi-
nated. Hence, the court in Behringer upheld the practice restrictions
implemented by the hospital in that case. Clause (b) of section 293
of the Restatement, dealing with probability of occurrence, addresses
the risk of transmission.3 63 Where an HIV-infected HCW performs
357. See supra notes 277-79, 315, 324 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities in
CDC guidelines).
358. See supra notes 137-72 (discussing individualized inquiry under § 504 and court inter-
pretations of requirement).
359. See Betsy A. Lehman, AIDS Tests for Health Caregivers?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1992,
at 27 (describing telephone listing service for HCWs to advertise that they are HIV negative).
The service, called "AIDS Negative Healthcare Professionals, Inc.," charges HCWs $99 a year
to be listed as HIV negative. Id. The HCWs send in their test results, receive certificates to
hang in their offices, and are put on a list available to the public to call by a toll-free number to
see if an HCW is listed. Id.
360. 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), af'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
361. 592 A.2d 1251 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
362. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1281 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991) (noting that social value that law attaches to threatened interest is important criterion
to consider in determining magnitude of risk to patient); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 293 cmt. a (1981) (stating that "as the social value of the interest imperiled increases, the
magnitude of the risk which is justified diminishes").
363. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 cl. b (1981) (stating that one factor to be
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one at-risk procedure, the risk of transmission is small. But the like-
lihood that an individual HCW will infect a patient becomes greater
as the infected HCW performs more and more operations. In addi-
tion, the number of infected HCWs will rise as the AIDS population
in general increases.364 In other words, the chance of a particular
transmission is small, but the likelihood of that transmission occur-
ring is growing greater over time. Clause (c) of the Restatement, the
extent of the harm likely to occur, becomes superfluous in this situa-
tion because the result of transmission is certain death.3 65 The only
question that remains is how long death will take. Under this clause
a risk of transmission, however small, can never be justified because
the result of infection is death. Clause (d) of section 293, address-
ing the fact that a higher proportional duty results as more people
may potentially be affected,3 66 is especially relevant in this situation
because a surgeon may perform numerous operations.3 67 Based on
this analysis, the court in Behringer reasoned that certain bright lines
needed to be drawn.368
Some commentators advocate mandatory HIV testing for all
HCWs who perform invasive procedures3 69 and argue that those
who refuse to be tested should be denied licenses to perform at-risk
procedures.3 70 A more reasonable plan, however, one based on
programs already in place, is achievable. The courts in Leckelt and
considered in determining magnitude of risk is "the extent of the chance that the actor's
conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other or one of a class of which the other
is a member"). The comment on clause (b) suggests that the utility needed to justify risk
increases as the probability increases. Id. § 293 cmt. b. Therefore, this clause begs the ques-
tion presented in Behringer that in most instances a noninfected HCW can be substituted,
reducing the utility of having a surgeon who is HIV positive perform that procedure. Behr-
inger, 592 A.2d at 1282 (quoting Keyes, supra note 20, at 603-04, that noninfected HCWs can
adequately be substituted to perform invasive procedures without risk of transmission).
364. See Lehman, supra note 359, at 27 (citing CDC estimation that of approximately 4.5
million HCWs in United States, 360 surgeons, 1200 dentists, 5000 physicians, and 35,000
other HCWs are HIV infected).
365. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293(c) (1981) (stating proposition that costs
to prevent harm may increase as severity of harm and its likelihood increases).
366. Id. § 293(d) (considering number of individuals whose "interests are likely to be in-
vaded if the risk takes effect in harm").
367. See Mishu et al., supra note 37, at 467 (reporting results of study to assess risk of
transmission from surgeon with "busy practice" of approximately 300 surgical procedures per
year).
368. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991) (adopting clear policy that precludes infected HCWs from performing any invasive
procedures when there is any risk of transmission).
369. E.g., Closen, supra note 346, at 422.
370. See Closen, supra note 346, at 434-36 (arguing that all HCWs who perform invasive
procedures, including dentists, doctors, nurses, and emergency medical technicians, should
be tested and retested on regular basis as requirement for licensing). The author also con-
tends that the onus should be on the HCW to arrange and pay for the test and provide the
results to the licensing authority. Id. at 435. Failure to provide evidence of a negative result
would bar that professional from certain practices. Id at 436.
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Behringer found that hospitals have an affirmative duty to provide a
safe environment for patients and employees.37' For instance, both
courts found that hospitals have a duty to conduct an inquiry into
the employee's health and also to examine the degree of risk that an
infected HCW will transmit a contagious disease to another per-
son. 37 2 To carry out these responsibilities, health care institutions
must know their employees' HIV status. Therefore, as these courts
held, blanket mandatory testing is not necessary, but HIV testing is
compelled where the medical institution has a reasonable suspicion
that an employee may be putting him or herself, other employees,
or patients at risk.
Where the hospital has a reasonable basis to suspect that an em-
ployee performing invasive procedures may be infected, either be-
cause the HCW is a member of an at-risk group or operates on
known or suspected HIV-positive patients, that HCW should be
tested and retested based on the evolution of the disease.373 If the
HCW tests positive for the virus, the hospital should prohibit any
further invasive procedures by that HCW, as the medical center did
in Behringer. This is a blanket prohibition, regardless of the physical
and mental capability of the HCW to perform the procedure. At
this point, the health care institution must work with the infected
professional to make a noninvasive procedural practice available to
371. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1989) (holding
hospital's obligations to provide safety and infection control to patients and employees allow
it to require HIV testing of hospital staff), aftd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Estate of Behr-
inger v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1276, 1283 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (concluding
that medical center acted reasonably and indeed as it was obligated to do when it decided not
to allow HIV-positive plaintiff to perform invasive procedures, based on safety of patients and
other hospital personnel).
372. See supra notes 148-71 and accompanying text (discussing determinations of courts in
Leckelt and Behringer that in order for hospitals to comply with duty to provide safe environ-
ment, hospitals have duty to investigate employees' health status).
373. It is estimated that roughly 40,000 to 80,000 people become infected with HIV each
year. Erik Eckholm, A Casualty Report; AIDS, Fatally Steady in the U.S., Accelerates Worldwide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1992, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5. Approximately one third are drug abusers,
another third are gay men, and most of the remaining third, who contracted the disease
through heterosexual contact, are black and hispanic women. Id. Minority women account
for the fastest-growing segment of the HIV-infected population. Maria Navarro, AIDS in Wo-
men Rising, but Many Ignore the Threat, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 28, 1990, at B 1, B2 (reporting that from
1988 to 1989, CDC officials say, number of AIDS cases in American women increased 297o,
compared with 18% in men). Many of these women are poor minorities. Id.; see also Laura
Blumenfeld, The New Sexual 'Reality', Now, a Condom for Women, WASH. POST, vlar. 9, 1992, at B5
(quoting Surgeon General Antonia Novello as saying most women infected with AIDS are
minorities). AIDS cases in 1991 rose 17% among women, compared with 4% among men.
Blumenfeld, supra, at B5. In addition, the prevalence of AIDS among teenagers is believed to
be on the rise. See Amy Goldstein, D.C. Unveils Anti-AIDS Campaign, WAsH. POST, May 13,
1992, at Al (noting that percentage of D.C. teenagers infected with HIV has increased five-
fold since 1987, doubling in last year alone). In May 1992, the District of Columbia joined 11
other cities in distributing condoms in schools in response to the teen AIDS problem. Id. at
A4.
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him or her, thereby eliminating the risk of transmission in a reason-
able and effective manner.
Commentators argue that this approach invites discrimination
against suspected at-risk HCWs or, at worst, encourages institu-
tional "witch hunts" against segments of the population.3 74 While
this is a valid concern, as the courts in Leckelt and Behringer pointed
out, hospitals have a proactive duty to provide a safe environment
for HCWs, patients, and foreseeable third parties.3 75 These com-
mentators seem to suggest that hospitals should refrain from acting
until they are confronted by an incident of actual transmission or
similar occurrence. 376
Regarding informed consent, a bright-line rule compelling disclo-
sure where HIV-positive doctors are performing invasive proce-
dures is another possible solution. On the other hand, HIV-positive
HCWs could be required to disclose their conditions to their pa-
tients regardless of the procedures they intend to perform. This
second approach, however, has been rejected as overbroad,377 with
commentators arguing that disclosure should only be required on a
case-by-case basis because a bright-line rule is too all-encompass-
ing.3 78 Others contend that information regarding an HCW's infec-
tion is never material with respect to consent; therefore, patients
need not know that their doctors are HIV positive.
3 79
374. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 321 (criticizing Leckelt holding as creating institu-
tional paranoia based on "suspicions of sexual history and drug use or on race and ethnic-
ity"); Gostin, supra note 57, at 308 (contending that court in Leckelt, by defining "invasive"
procedures broadly, invites categorized, overbroad determinations of procedures in question
such that noninfected HCWs may be forced to be tested because of their practice areas).
Also, Barnes argues that such a program would be inherently underinclusive because HCWs
under these conditions would be less likely to come forward for voluntary testing and to re-
veal their condition to their employer medical institution. Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 321-
22.
375. See supra notes 148-71 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative duty on hospi-
tals to protect its workers and patients).
376. Cf Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 319-20 (suggesting that there is no reason why HIV
policy should differ from HBV policy where hospitals wait until transmission has occurred
before acting). But see Gostin, supra note 57, at 306 (arguing that CDC cannot allow possible
transmission of HIV before acting because HIV is always lethal, whereas HBV is not).
377. See Gostin, supra note 57, at 304-05 (arguing that HCWs should not be required to
disclose their infection status to patients). Gostin does believe, however, that infected HCWs
should be restricted in their practices of "seriously invasive procedures." Id. at 306. ("Wait-
ing for cases of transmission of a lethal infection like HIV before taking any action [as we do
with HBV] would undermine trust in the health care system. The CDC simply could not
tolerate possible transmission of HIV through a mode which is well documented.").
378. See Orentlicher,supra note 31, at 1136 (advocating that HCWs follow CDC guidelines
of determining in each instance whether patient should be informed of HCW's HIV status).
But see Keyes, supra note 20, at 610 (arguing that HIV-infected HCW has duty to disclose that
fact to patient where invasive procedures are to be performed).
379. See Daniels, supra note 278, at 1370-71 (contending that actual risk is too small to be
material and therefore require patient consent, but subjective belief by public that HIV status
is material implicates, if patients' rights predominate, that patient will switch from infected
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If HIV-positive HCWs are prohibited from performing invasive
procedures, the question of informed consent is moot as there is no
proven risk of transmission from casual contact. It follows, there-
fore, that where HIV-positive HCWs do not perform at-risk proce-
dures, there is no need to release the fact of infection to their
patients. Moreover, courts have levied on institutions a duty to pro-
tect the privacy of an infected HCW by not disseminating such in-
formation to the general community.3 80 Releasing that information
to a patient where no proven risk of transmission exists would vio-
late the institution's duty.
In the rare instance in which an HIV-positive HCW is the only
one capable of performing a needed procedure, there is a clear re-
quirement to inform the patient of the HCW's condition. In Behr-
inger, the hospital board eventually adopted a policy permitting an
HIV-positive HCW to perform invasive procedures, as long as the
hospital still required the patient's consent to the procedure after
being informed of the surgeon's HIV-positive status.38 1 The court's
decision was predicated on concern for the emotional trauma that
potential postoperative testing procedures might cause in a patient,
even if the patient did not become seropositive for HIV.a8 2 The risk
of transmission in combination with this trauma was too much. The
court wrote that "it is untenable to argue against informed consent
combined with a restriction on procedures which present 'any risk'
to the patient."3 83 Where HIV-positive HCWs perfbrm invasive
procedures, their patients must be informed as part of the consent
procedure. Law and ethics require no less.
CONCLUSION
The prevalence of AIDS in society is a concern that grows every
day. Homosexuals and intravenous drug users are no longer the
only groups being affected by the disease. Of all identifiable demo-
graphic groups, the fastest growing group of infected individuals is
HCW to uninfected HCW, which would irrationally discriminate against infected HCWs who
actually pose no risk of harm).
380. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1273-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991) (holding that hospital violated plaintiff's right to confidentiality by allowing public
access to plaintiff's medical records, resulting in effective end to plaintiff's practice).
381. See id. at 1258-59 (explaining final policy by hospital to continue to treat AIDS pa-
tients without discrimination and to allow HIV-positive HCW to treat patients as long as no
risk of transmission is presented, but also to require that patient be informed of any risk and
physician obtain written informed consent before surgical procedure is performed).
382. See id. at 1266 (discussing expert testimony presented at trial explaining that in-
formed consent is necessary to avoid emotional anxiety that would occur if patient is informed
of possible transmission only after at-risk procedure or surgical accident).
383. Id. at 1283.
[Vol. 42:479
HIV TESTING OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS
heterosexuals. In comparison, the risk of transmission from HCWs
to patients may seem insignificant, notwithstanding the publicity
and the politics surrounding Kimberly Bergalis' case. Addressing
the issue of the HIV-infected HCW should nonetheless be part of a
national, concerted effort to control the spread of the disease.
While the CDC guidelines attempt to fulfill this role, they will be
ultimately unsuccessful.
Common law response to the HIV-infected HCW provides a more
efficacious framework for hospitals and HCWs to use in resolving
these problems. The common law, within the tort theory of the
"special relationship" among HCWs, medical institutions, and pa-
tients, articulates the duties triggered in this situation, delineates
the proper actions, and effectively minimizes liabilities. The CDC
guidelines, on the other hand, fail both to articulate specific duties
and to delineate alternatives. Guidelines setting national standards
are necessary and should be binding as regulations. The CDC
guidelines, however, should be amended to reflect more accurately
the state of the common law, which assumes a greater duty on the
part of the hospital in confronting the HIV-infected HCW.
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